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ABSTRACT
This Article has a dual focus: the use of patent portfolios for
maximal near-term commercialization in nanobiotechnology, synthetic
biology, and interference RNA, and the creation of commons for
maximal long-term medical gain in these technologies. These three
technologies show great promise for clinical medicine, but only in the
long-term. At least twenty years of R&D will be required to overcome
scientific and technological barriers to a revolutionary medical
breakthrough. For near-term R&D, different routes to patent portfolioenabled commercialization are described and prescribed. A patent
portfolio theory is presented which views the portfolio as the principal
unit of intellectual property value because many firms maximize scale
and diversity of intellectual property protection through a careful
drafting of many distinct, but related, patents. The theory is qualified
by the extraordinarily valuable outlier patent that to some extent is
“decontextualized,” i.e., its market value is partly independent from that
of its portfolio. Patent thickets and low quality patents, as well as recent
doctrinal and likely forthcoming statutory changes that should reduce
these problems, are addressed. Multidimensional, modifiable roadmaps
to commercialization are prescribed to meet near-term challenges.
Research-based alliances (e.g., cross-university alliances), as well as
exclusive licenses with start-ups, should often be considered. Plans for
acquiring venture capital and developing patent portfolios that attract
good acquisition offers from pharmaceutical or biotechnology
companies often must also be made.
Patent portfolio-enabled
commercialization should be complemented by foundational commons
that solidify the upstream basic science and technology building blocks
for the technologies. Commons are also needed for high risk, but also
potentially very high medical return, multidisciplinary and long-term
R&D in these three technologies.
INTRODUCTION
This is an attempt to hit moving targets that, if captured as freezeframes, would defy ready characterization.
I predict probable
developmental paths and consider feasible, though less probable,
alternative developmental paths for three polymorphic nascent
1
technologies in the life sciences: nanobiotechnology (NB/BN), synthetic

1. A
coherent
distinction
between
“nanobiotechnology”
(NB)
and
“bionanotechnology” (BN) appears exceedingly difficult. “Nanobiotechnology” may often
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2

biology, and interference RNA (RNAi).
These three nascent
technologies have enough similarities and differences in terms of patent
portfolio issues, probable paths to commercial development, and
promises for future medical advances to be fruitfully compared and
3
contrasted in this Article.
Developmental paths will evolve as
congressional statutes, federal court doctrine, and U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) procedure also evolve over the coming years
and decades, in part as both causes and effects of how the technologies
4
evolve. Because of the great uncertainties involved in these evolutions,
part of this Article thus focuses on a key to commercializing particular
nascent life science technologies—building effective patent portfolios—
under conditions of high scientific, technological, and legal uncertainty,
5
where decision-making itself is poorly understood.
The technological and scientific landscapes are even more complex
than they are uncertain, although the uncertainty is a large part of the
6
multilayered complexities in the pertinent sciences and technologies.
The breadth and overlap—and potentially overwhelmingly large
number—of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi patent portfolios,
complex as they are, are exceeded in complexity by the broad and
7
overlapping technologies that these portfolios could potentially cover.
This second, greater complexity is exceeded still by a third: multilayered
and overlapping intracellular human genetic mechanisms and epigenetic
8
systems. The fact that our pertinent human biology is even more
complex than the extremely multifarious and challenging technologies
should give us some pause when we hear of potential major medical
include technology that would also be considered “bionanotechnology,” and vice versa.
Because of this taxonomical difficulty and the related breadth of technology in a set that
would include NB, BN, and technology in the intersection of NB and BN,
“nanobiotechnology” will be defined broadly as NB and/or BN, or “NB/BN.” See infra Part
II and note 22.
2. See infra Parts I, III–V.
3. See infra Parts I–V.
4. See infra Parts I–V.
5. Cf. Interview by Sean Silverthorne with Gary P. Pisano, Harry E. Figgie, Jr.
Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, in Science Business: What
Happened to Biotech?, HARV. BUS. WK. (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5503.html (statement of Gary P. Pisano) (“[T]he business side of
the [biotechnology] industry [has been] continually challenged by . . . profound and persistent
uncertainty, [a] complex and heterogeneous . . . scientific knowledge base, and . . . rapid . . .
scientific progress.”).
6. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV–V.
7. See infra Parts I–II, IV–V.
8. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, V.B.1.
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breakthroughs, such as prophylactics or cures for cancers, coming from
9
the technologies anytime soon.
Although possible, it is not likely that such prophylactics or cures
could come without a much more complete picture of the pertinent
chemistry (e.g., cellular and systemic structures) and physics (e.g.,
pertinent quantum mechanical and classical forces and their influences
10
on normal and pathological conditions). We need a deeper and more
precise understanding of various cellular mechanisms and epigenetic
systems (in the case of cancer, this would require, inter alia, a much
better comprehension of the forces that promote and prevent
11
carcinogenesis and metastasis).
In Part I, I briefly survey each of the three nascent technologies,
creating overviews of likely near-term and long-term future
developments. In Part II, I look at efficacious patent portfolio
construction and management primarily from the standpoint of how a
patent practitioner could assist a government agency, university, or
start-up that is looking to develop and commercialize an NB/BN,
synthetic biology, or RNAi invention. In Part III, I further examine
how a practitioner could use patent portfolios to help his or her client
via exclusive licensing, getting and maintaining venture capital, and
becoming an attractive target for acquisition by a large pharmaceutical
or biotechnology company. Intellectual property (IP) is typically one of
the most valuable assets of a government agency, university, or start-up
seeking to commercialize innovation in cutting edge applications in the
12
life sciences. An effective IP portfolio and a carefully planned and
executed exclusive license between a government agency or university
and a start-up are often crucial to receive venture capital, which has thus
13
far been the lifeblood of most start-ups with very high input costs.
New complicated technologies almost invariably involve high input
costs, thus creating incentives to maximize IP protection early, broadly,
14
and often. In NB/BN, synthetic biology, and, to a lesser extent, RNAi,
patents that were too broad in scope were pursued and granted too
15
early and too often to too many inventors.
9. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV, V.B.
10. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV, V.B.
11. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV, V.B.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Parts III.C–III.E.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.B in regards to nanomedicine patent applications. Cf. Raj Bawa,
Editorial Commentary, Will the Nanomedicine “Patent Land Grab” Thwart
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Many patent thickets and invalid patents either loom or already
exist, creating barriers to commercialization in sectors in all three
16
nascent industries. Patents that become entangled in thickets probably
face formidable validity and infringement challenges if and when the
17
pertinent technology becomes commercially viable. The thickets thus
create barriers to gaining that commercialization in the first place, partly
because venture capitalists are understandably wary of investing in a
18
company that is likely to face patent litigation. Fortunately, the federal
courts, Congress, and the PTO are in the process of creating changes in
the law which will help weed out the thickets and increase patent
19
quality, although they have not gone far enough. In Part V.A, I
advocate further legal changes that could effect additional patent
thicket weeding and increases in patent quality. Finally, in Part V.B, I
recommend an increase in the ratio of long-term rigorous, ambitious,
and publicly funded research and development (R&D) to patent
portfolio-driven near-term commercial R&D in these technologies. The
prescription is based mainly on projections that increasing this ratio
would probably direct and expedite progress towards removing or
circumventing scientific and technological obstacles to revolutionary
20
medical applications of the technologies.
The greatest long-term
prospects—in terms of public good payoffs—are the improvements in
health and increases in longevity that these still largely undeveloped life
science technologies could provide via high-tech and highly personalized
21
medicine.

Commercialization?, 1 NANOMEDICINE: NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGY & MED. 346, 347
(2006) [hereinafter Bawa Commentary] (stating that “[f]or more than a decade all of the
world’s major patent offices have faced an onslaught of nanomedicine-related patent
applications. . . . [R]esearchers, executives, and patent lawyers are making an effort to obtain
broad protection for new nanoscale polymers and materials that have applications in
nanomedicine.”) (citations omitted). Such problems may not be particular to these nascent
technologies or even to nascent technologies in general. In the United States at least, too
many low quality patents may be the general patent office norm, not the exception. See Cecil
D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 210 (2006)
(arguing that “[t]he patent proliferation that results from the U.S. patent system’s current low
standards for patentability and the necessity for would-be innovators to engage in defensive
patenting is felt forcefully throughout the business community and among innovators. More
patents mean more patent obstacles and higher costs for would-be innovators.”).
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Parts II.B, III.E.
19. See infra Part II.C.1.
20. See infra Part V.B.2.
21. See infra Parts IV, V.B.2.
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I.

PRESENT AND PROBABLE FUTURE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITIES

NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi are life science technologies
that, just in the last few years, have attained a large amount of public
and private funding—and much patenting as well—largely because of
their perceived commercial potential in many areas, most notably,
pharmaceuticals. Ironically, however, there is much uncertainty—
especially in medicine—as to whether any of the technologies will make
any truly major advances. More fundamentally, precisely what each of
these technologies is, how it will develop, and how to differentiate it
from the others is also not certain. I will not attempt to differentiate
22
“nanobiotechnology” from “bionanotechnology.” I will instead define
nanotechnological biotechnology/biotechnological nanotechnology
23
(NB/BN) as the interface of nanotechnology with biotechnology.
Nanotechnology includes nanomaterials, nanointermediates, nano24
Biotechnology includes gene
enabled products, and nanotools.
25
cloning, as well as genetic, cell, and tissue engineering.
NB/BN
includes many technologies that are pertinent to either NB or BN, or

22. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
23. Nanotechnology’s polymorphisms, combined with its poorly established scale
definitions, create a degree of nebulousness which may be troubling for both the technology
and patents related to it. See Nicholas J. Uhlir, Note Throwing a Wrench In the System: SizeDependent Properties, Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B. J. 327,
338 (2006) (“Because nanotechnology is a rapidly evolving science, measurement standards
often do not exist for the properties the technology exhibits.”).
Many of these
polymorphisms exist within NB/BN. Although nanobiotechnology and bionanotechnology
are often used interchangeably, providing further taxonomical confusion, there also appears
to be little discussion and no existing consensus on whether the terms are truly synonymous,
whether it matters, and why one term is used as opposed to the other. See Nature
Nanotechnology, Nature Publishing Group, Editorial, Live Wires, 1 NATURE
NANOTECHNOLOGY 79, 79 (2006) (“[S]hould the field be called nanobiotechnology or
bionanotechnology? Nature Nanotechnology prefers the former, and a quick search on
Google confirms this by more than three-to-one. But which is correct? Are there subtle
differences between the two?”). Any distinction between a nanotechnological biotechnology
(NB) subset and a biotechnological nanotechnology (BN) subset may inevitably be nebulous,
given the evolving states of both nanotechnology and biotechnology. Moreover, there may
be many types of technology that could be classified as both NB and BN.
24. See LUX RESEARCH, THE LUX NANOTECH INDEX (2007), available at
http://www.luxresearchinc.com/pxn.php [hereinafter LUX NANOTECH INDEX] (referring to
nanomaterials, nanointermediates, nano-enabled products, and nanotools as four stages of a
nanotechnology value chain).
25. See generally HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY (Sara
Tenney ed., 6th ed. 2008) (1986). As with the list of types of nanotechnology just given, see
LUX NANOTECH INDEX, supra note 24, this list of types of biotechnology represents the
technology accurately, but not comprehensively.
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both.
RNAi—i.e., microRNA (miRNA) or short interfering RNA
27
(siRNA)—is a fairly recently discovered means of gene silencing.
26. For example, biomolecular and biomimetic devices; biosensors; molecular motors;
biomolecular fabrics; bioseparations via nanofiltration; subsets of engineered enzymes and
proteins created by metabolic engineering; nanoparticle-enabled drug discovery and delivery;
other nanotherapeutics and nanodiagnostics; optical semiconductors; catalysts for organic
reaction; use of nanobiomimetics in nonbiological systems; and use of actin filaments in
electronic circuitry.
This representative list of technologies in the interface of
nanotechnology and biotechnology, though longer than the representative list for either
technology alone, see supra notes 24–25, is still far from comprehensive.
27. See A DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY 42, 568-72 (Robert S. Hine ed., Oxford
University Press 6th ed. 2008) (describing succinctly how RNAi evolved from antisense DNA
technology and how double-stranded RNA (dsRNA) is superior to antisense single-stranded
DNA (ssDNA) as a silencing tool in that dsRNA is not susceptible to degradation via
DNAases). There are two RNAi sequential pathways: (1) a miRNA pathway; (i) a Dicer
protein cuts precursor fragments of miRNA into shorter fragments, typically twenty-one-totwenty-two nucleotides, (ii) a gene strand associates with an assembly of proteins, the RNAinduced silencing complex (RISC), (iii) “miRNA binds imperfectly to target . . . [the
complementary messenger RNA (mRNA) base sequence,] causing suppression of translation
. . . but not degradation of the mRNA”; and (2) a siRNA pathway. Id. at 570–71. (emphasis
added). The siRNA pathway also uses a Dicer cut and RISC assembly, although, unlike with
miRNA, the siRNA-RISC complex “binds to [the] target mRNA [base] sequence completely,
triggering cleavage and degradation of the mRNA.” Id. at 571 (emphasis added). RNAi is
described as having much promise to knockout specific genes to understand their function
and for new forms of targeted gene therapy, especially in oncology. See id at 571. Precursors
to siRNA “originate from various sources, including virus infection, introduced transgenes,
and transposons,” so it helps protect cells by targeting viral RNA for destruction and by
silencing transposons. Id. at 571. Transposons, or transposable elements (Tn elements), are
“jumping” DNA sequences that can transpose across the genome via the enzyme transposase,
thus mutating genes and damaging chromosomes. The siRNA-guided silencing mechanism
prevents the “jump” by destroying the complementary mRNA for transposable elements and
thereby precluding the production of transposase. See Philip D. Zamore, Genomic Defence
with a Slice of Pi, 446 NATURE 864, 864 (2007); GEORGE M. MALACINSKI & DAVID
FREIFELDER, ESSENTIALS OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 364–65 (3rd ed. 1998). See also
Gilbert Chin & Jake Yeston, Editors’ Choice: Promoting Silence, 317 SCIENCE 427, 427, 429
(2007) (discussing Jiang Han et al., Promoter-associated RNA is Required for RNA-directed
Transcriptional Gene Silencing in Human Cells, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12422 (2007))
(providing a very brief review of the capacity of RNAi to modulate gene expression by either
degrading mRNA or blocking translation and reporting that siRNAs in yeast act by
degrading “low-abundance nascent transcripts, rather than on the DNA.”). Chin & Yeston,
supra. “In human cells, siRNAs directed against promoter sequences can block gene
transcription. Do these siRNAs act on the promoter DNA or, as in yeast, an RNA species?”
Id. at 429. Research also suggests that suppressing a variant of a human EF1a mRNA
promoter approximately 230 base pairs upstream from this promoter reduces the ability of
siRNA to induce transcriptional silencing. Id. When miRNA, but not siRNA, act on mRNA
such that translational blocking occurs sans mRNA degradation, the degree of translational
blocking may need to be proportionate to the amount of mRNA. This would be true if
pertinent bacterial findings can be extrapolated to yeast (and possibly to humans), because
bacterial research has found the ratio of mRNA/protein production to be constant. See
Narendra Maheshri & Erin K. O’Shea, Living with Noisy Genes: How Cells Function
Reliably with Inherent Variability in Gene Expression, 36 ANN. REV. BIOPHYSICS
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Similarly, synthetic biology is a fairly new area of bioengineering with
ambitions such as the artificial synthesis of macro-level biological
systems using programmable parts or “gene switches” connected via a
28
modular interface. There are many technologies that intersect two of
the three nascent technologies of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi,
and some in the interface of all three. Some of these intersecting
29
technologies are potentially highly salutary.
However, the three
technologies are often discussed separately in both scientific literature
and legal literature. These considerations support the mutual coverage
and the separate categorization of the three technologies in this Article.

BIOMOLECULAR STRUCTURE 413, 418 (2006) (reviewing experiments that utilized
“stochastic [in vivo] models of gene expression to infer . . . mRNA[] and protein dynamics . . .
[from] static snapshots of protein distribution . . . [which created] steady-state protein levels . .
. [that confirmed] the validity of the common assumption that protein production is
proportional to mRNA levels”).
28. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2007).
Synthetic biology’s long-term goals encompass such far-reaching possibilities as
constructing an entirely artificial programmable genome from standard parts. . . .
More immediately, synthetic biology “systems”—that is, organisms engineered with
artificial metabolic pathways composed of a number of different standard parts—
have produced important concrete results, including the possibility of unlimited
supplies of previously expensive drugs for malaria.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. In the interface of NB/BN’s potential cellular applications and synthetic biology’s
engineering ambitions, see, for example, Richard Jones, Thesis, What Can Biology Teach
Us?, 1 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 85, 86 (2006) (conjecturing that some physicists might
want to take synthetic biology’s engineering ambition of reintroducing systemic functionality
to a stripped-down host organism further by using nature’s design of the cell as a roadmap for
synthesizing all of the synthetic components of the cell). See also Mitchel J. Doktycz &
Michael L. Simpson, Perspective, Nano-Enabled Synthetic Biology, 3:125 MOLECULAR
SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 1, 1–7 (2007) (arguing that the use of unique physical properties of
nanoscale materials, guided by systems biology principles, permit the construction of
synthetic structures with cell-like characteristics). The authors outline the research needed
for the creation of nano-enabled synthetic biology. Nano-enabled synthetic biology will
ultimately include hybrid systems that expand the synthetic biology toolbox, with the possible
eventual realization of “synthetic systems of high functional density and cell-like complexity.”
Id. at 7. In the interface of NB/BN and RNAi, see, for example, Robert Berry, Dendritic
Nanotechnologies, Inc.:
The Keys to Nanotechnology—Precision, Scalability, and
Reproducibility, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 175, 179–80 (2005) (arguing that dendritic
polymer nanostructures would be excellent reagents for the delivery of siRNA in vivo and in
vitro). In the interface of RNA generally (and thus not just RNAi) and synthetic biology, see
Farren J. Isaacs et al., Review, RNA Synthetic Biology, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 545,
545–53 (2006), for a discussion of various computational and directed-evolution ambitions for
engineering both more complex RNA systems and novel, diverse RNA molecules that could
sense, probe, and control a variety of cellular, molecular, and large-scale systemic
components, and the obstacles to realizing these ambitions.
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A. The Present and Near Future: Incremental Progress
Pharmaceuticals are perhaps the most promising area for all three
fields. However, a distinction must be made between that which has
been patented and that which has actually convinced the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) that it is safe and effective for medical use.
There are frequent reports of nanotechnology drug delivery tools and
30
nano-reformulated drugs in “existing use.” However, in its most recent
consumer update, dated July 25, 2007, the FDA states:
Some day, you may see nanotechnology used . . . to provide new
drugs that are able to reach sites in the body more effectively and
at safer doses[,] create tiny sensors that detect diseases in the
body far earlier than existing diagnostic tools[,] [and]
manufacture incredibly small pumps that can be implanted to
deliver lifesaving medications precisely to the cells and tissues
31
that need them.
In contrast, the FDA’s list of current medical uses includes only the
most mundane and apparently least risky applications, such as
32
sunscreens and protective and glare-reducing coatings for eyeglasses.
The FDA indirectly addresses this discrepancy, but does not clearly

30. E.g., Peter Coffee, Fads and Hype in Technology: The Sargasso Sea of “Some Day
SCIENCE, INNOVATION, AND
Soon,” in LYNN E. FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY:
OPPORTUNITY 19, 28 (2006) (arguing that nanotechnology is not a fad, but a trend, as
indicated by “existing uses, such as . . . drug-delivery tools”); Paul J.A. Borrn & David
Berube, A Tale of Opportunities, Uncertainties, and Risks, 3 NANOTODAY 56, 57–58 (2008)
(reporting both that a rapidly increasing nano-based market includes medical products such
as heart valves, drug delivery systems, and imaging techniques and that nanosilver coatings
are also increasingly used in products such as wound dressings and urinary catheters).
31. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Consumer Update, FDA
Readies for More ‘Nanoscale’ Challenges (July 25, 2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/consumer/updates/nanotech072507.html [hereinafter FDA Readies for
More Nanoscale Challenges] (emphasis added).
32.
[A] few cosmetic products claim to contain nanoparticles to increase the
stability or modify [the] release of ingredients. Similarly[, the] FDA is aware
of nanotechnology-related claims made for certain sunscreens. We are
currently not aware of any safety concerns[,] but [the] FDA is planning
additional studies to examine the effects of select nanoparticles on skin
penetration.
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/faqs.html (last visited
Nov. 07, 2008) [hereinafter FDA Statement on Whether There are Regulated Nanotech
Products] (answering the question “[a]re there any FDA-regulated products currently on the
market that employ nanotechnology?”).
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state whether non-sunscreen or non-cosmetic uses (e.g., prescription
drugs or medical devices used for medical prevention or treatment) of
33
nanotechnology are currently marketed.
The contrast between
apparent overstatements of the extent of present pharmaceutical
applications from enthusiastic private sources and the FDA’s apparent
excess caution in focusing mostly on cosmetics and sunscreens may
reflect source-driven agendas that lead to questions of bias. That said,
most likely even very enthusiastic industry representatives would admit
that technological barriers to the use of NB/BN in pharmaceuticals, at
least for now, preclude revolutionary advances in treatment for oftenlethal diseases. Similarly, even the FDA admits that NB/BN has an
34
impressive future pharmaceutical potential, although, of course, safety,
efficacy, and environmental effects will have to be adequately
addressed. Certainly, though a few may be on the market, FDAapproved NB/BN drug tools and nano-enabled drugs are not
revolutionizing medical treatment at this time.
It is highly probable that scientific and technological barriers will
also keep NB/BN from revolutionizing medical treatment in the near
future. For instance, in nanoparticle-enabled gene therapy or drug
delivery, pertinent science and engineering investigations tell us that we
are just starting to understand the formidable limitations to precisely
targeted delivery such as demonstrated size and charge-determined
disruptions of polycationic organic nanoparticles on living cell
35
membranes. Because uses of synthetic biology and RNAi also involve

33. Cf. id. (“[S]everal FDA regulated products . . . employ nanotechnology. However,
to date, few manufacturers of regulated products have claimed the use of nanotechnology in
the manufacture of their products or made any nanotechnology claims for the finished
product.”).
34. See FDA Readies for More Nanoscale Challenges, supra note 31.
35. Pascale R. Leroueil et al., Nanoparticle Interaction with Biological Membranes:
Does Nanotechnology Present a Janus Face?, 40 ACCTS. OF CHEMICAL RES. 335, 336–37
(2007) (investigating how polycationic organic nanoparticles might cross a mammalian cell
membrane). The authors conducted experiments that selected dimyristoylphosphatidyl
choline (DMPC) as a supported lipid bilayer in a crystalline phase to see if and, if so, how this
mimic of a mammalian plasma membrane might be disrupted by polycationic organic
nanoparticles. Id. The authors were able to image “hole” or “pore” formation directly in the
lipid bilayer of DMPC, generally associated with exposure to various polycationic polymer
species. Id. at 337, 339. The nanoparticles were hypothesized to enter cells not via
endocytosis or phagocytosis mechanisms, but by an adhesive or diffusive mechanism. The
authors, however, concluded that “[c]learly, more studies [were] needed to fully understand
the process by which nanoparticles cross the cell plasma membrane. . . . Gaining a better
understanding of this mechanism has important implications for design of drug delivery, cell
transfection, and gene therapy agents.” Id. at 341.
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intricate cellular and extracellular processes, they will likely face similar
formidable, though often not insurmountable, obstacles to successful
36
implementation.
B. In 20-to-40 Years: Revolutionary Progress, Effecting Leaps Forward
in Medicine
1. Interim Work Towards the Probable Revolutionary Advances:

36. Cellular and extracellular obstacles to the implementation of RNAi include the
limit that yet-to-be-determined standards for screening and phenotype ontology create for
the use of RNAi to identify loss-of-function or gene silencing phenotypes. See Thomas Horn
et al., GenomeRNAi: A Database for Cell-Based RNAi Phenotypes, 35 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES.
D492
(DATABASE
ISSUE)
D496
(2007),
available
at
http://nar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/35/suppl_1/D492 (arguing that major unsolved
challenges “in representing RNAi phenotypes . . . [include] a lack of standards on [the]
minimal information . . . need[ed] . . . for small and large-scale screening approaches” and a
proper descriptive ontology for cellular phenotypes). As for cellular and extracellular
obstacles to the implementation of synthetic biology, see Keith E. Tyo et al., Expanding the
Metabolic Engineering Toolbox:
More Options to Engineer Cells, 25 TRENDS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 132, 132 (2007). The artificiality of synthetic cellular solutions to many
problems, including pathological cellular conditions, poses the challenge of discovering “ways
to remodel highly interconnected cellular networks to add properties that are often
orthogonal to . . . [their evolved] design . . . .” Id. See also Philippe Marguet et al., Biology by
Design: Reduction and Synthesis of Cellular Components and Behaviour, 4 J. ROYAL SOC’Y
INTERFACE 607, 619 (2007) (arguing that it is critical for synthetic biology to address this
question: “given the amount of cell physiology (even for highly characterized organisms such
as E. coli) that is still poorly understood, to what extent can we standardize parts or systems
with confidence?”); Ernesto Andrianantoandro et al., Review, Synthetic Biology: New
Engineering Rules for an Emerging Discipline, 2 MOLECULAR SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 1, 1–2
(2006), available at http://www.nature.com/msb/journal/v2/n1/pdf/msb4100073.pdf (comparing
the prospective development of synthetic biology to the actual development of computer
engineering). The authors argue that, to construct biological systems, synthetic biology will
have to extend engineering principles to accommodate the unique set of design problems and
solutions across populations of cells. Id. But see J. Christopher Anderson et al.,
Environmental Signal Integration by a Modular AND Gate, 3:133 MOLECULAR SYSTEMS
BIOLOGY 1, 5-6 (2007) for a report of a successful construction of a modular synthetic biology
interface that integrates environmental signals. Input promoters are cleverly constructed as
independent sensors of when different, often non-integrated, environmental signals (e.g.,
oxygen, pH, cell density, lactate, and glucose) acquire the integration necessary for specificity.
Only then are the two input promoters—inputs to an AND gate—activated and swapped with
outputs using the AND gate. Id. at 5. This swapping of inputs and outputs (the inputs and
outputs being easily replaceable transcriptional signals), while preserving the AND gate
behavior, is reported to demonstrate the modularity of the AND gate. Id. at 6. The model is
also reported to require the use of a particular plasmid and fluorescent reporter system that
facilitates the eventual standardization of genetic circuits connected in a series which the
authors report to be “a critical approach in the design of large integrated systems consisting
of multiple genetic circuits.” Id. See also Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, for some assertions of
synthetic biology’s future powers if obstacles to these powers could be removed or
circumvented.
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Identification and Removal, or Circumvention, of Scientific and
Technological Obstacles
If these three technologies, considered alone or as a group, were
graded on what they will most probably deliver in the near future to
patients with often-lethal diseases, such as various forms of cancer, they
would receive a B-. However, if they were graded, either separately or
as a totality, twenty years hence—assuming scientific, technological,
legal, and funding conditions facilitate the proper research and
37
development paths—they would receive an A+. This is a potential

37. However, the combination of these conditions needed to foster near-optimal
development is presently not in place. See recommendations for fostering near-optimal longterm development, infra Parts IV, V.B. If these conditions remain as they are now, my best
guesstimate of the time to A+ level development in terms of medical delivery would be about
forty years, or roughly double the time it would take if near-optimal conditions are put in
place in the near future. Although my “twenty-to-forty-year guesstimate” for achieving
revolutionary medical gain is admittedly only that, this guesstimate is preferable to stating
“near-to-remote future to remote future” both because of the nebulousness of this qualitative
projected range and because, considering all of the variables, I maintain that the twenty-toforty-year time frame is still a fair guesstimate. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. The
Ontario Medical Advisory Secretariat’s assessment of nanotechnology specialists’ projections
of expected timeframes for the use of nanotechnologies in clinical patient care also may
provide some credence to my guesstimate as it pertains to NB/BN. THE MEDICAL
ADVISORY SECRETARIAT, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE,
NANOTECHNOLOGY: HORIZON SCANNING APPRAISAL 30 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter
ONTARIO MEDICAL NANOTECH HORIZON] (stating the following: (1) although over half “of
the specialists . . . [predicted] that nano-based therapies will lead to major changes in
medicine over the next [twenty] years,” “potential beneficial effects are not expected on a
relatively large scale until after 2020”; (2) yet specialists were split about the extent to which
unexpected obstacles might lengthen the time to viable clinical delivery; and (3) moreover,
“[t]he time span between the first successes in the laboratory and general everyday
application is underestimated. Potential problems include the lack of long-term stability of
nanostructures and the manufacture of sufficiently large commercially viable quantities of
nanotechnology products (in particular, [three]-dimensional nanostructures).”). Note as well
that if the nanotechnology specialists would like to receive grants for research having
potential clinical medical applications, they have a conflict of interest that may lead to
negatively skewed time-frame estimates.
Such considerations make a National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) representative’s rather broad projections of radical
transformative change by 2020, unsupported by extensive factual investigation, appear
particularly questionable. Cf. Mihail C. Roco, National Nanotechnology Initiative—Past,
Present, Future, in HANDBOOK OF NANOSCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY 3–4
(William A. Goddard III et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (providing a sigmoid curve—with time (in
years) as the x axis, nanotechnology outcomes as the y axis, and the years 2000–2020 as
horizontal asymptotes—to represent his prediction of growth in nanotechnology outcomes
until we approximate a “nano-world” in 2020). If Roco is correct and his sigmoid curve fairly
accurately depicts the nanotechnology growth that will occur over the next eleven years,
exponential growth should be just around the corner, especially in NB/BN because “the most
dynamic component driving an accelerating path of change is the convergence of
nanotechnology, modern biology, and digital revolution.”
M.C. Roco, National
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problem with “just around the corner” hype: it hides the obstacles to
maximizing the development of highly promising technologies in the
remote future, because it fears that revealing these obstacles will
prevent near-term commercialization. Unfortunately, the near-term
ventures can only hope for a succession of incremental gains along a
38
modest, low-risk-for-investors R&D path.
Long-term development
must be based on solid, publicly funded research that broadly looks at
the potential scientific and technological uses of these technologies,
obstacles to realizing these potential uses, and ways to eliminate or
39
circumvent the obstacles.
Some high quality academic research on these very issues is already
being done. For instance, Jacob Klein, a physical chemist at Oxford
University, in commenting on his own and other “novel and important”
40
concurrent research, highlights potential clinical delivery problems in
NB/BN which are associated with interactions between nanoparticleprotein corona coating and the patient’s cell. He also recommends that
researchers use more sophisticated methods to measure pertinent
41
forces.
Several rigorous analyses highlighting barriers to

Nanotechnology
Initiative—Past,
Present,
Future
7–8,
preprint available
at
http://www.nano.gov/NNI_Past_Present_Future.pdf.
But considering not only the
nanotechnology specialist projections and the Ontario Secretariat’s description of possible
problems that could delay commercial translations of lab successes reported above, but also
the many studies revealing formidable obstacles to the realization of radical growth in
NB/BN, discussed in this part of the Article as well as in Parts I, II.C.2, IV, and V.B,
exponential growth in the near future appears overly optimistic, even under the best
scientific, technological, and legal conditions.
38. See infra Part V.B.1.
39. See infra Part V.B.
40. Most notably the research of Tommy Cedervall et al. published in Understanding
the Nanoparticle—Protein Corona Using Methods to Quantify Exchange Rates and Affinities
of Proteins for Nanoparticles, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2050 (2007).
41. Jacob Klein, Probing the Interactions of Proteins and Nanoparticles, 104 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2029, 2029–30 (2007) (arguing that nanoparticle-protein interactions that
effect corona coating show great potential in nanomedicine, especially nanotoxicology).
Klein also suggests that advances towards realizing this potential in nanomedicine will require
more quantitative and systematic research into the corona, as well as research into how the
“corona actually interacts with and affects the well-being of living cells, using, among other
approaches, the highly sophisticated methodologies that have been developed to measure
surface and intermolecular forces directly.” Id. Klein is also very complimentary of the
aforementioned concurrent research by Cedervall et al. Klein interprets Cedervall’s research
as showing that which proteins “win the competition” to adsorb on the nanoparticle surface
depend on these parameters: interactions of their affinities to the corona, time length of the
experiment, and whether available nanoparticle surface area is in excess to the protein
mixture or vice versa. Klein, supra at 2029. Klein argues that the protein mixture should be
in excess and, ideally, reflect what would occur in a “true biological situation” (e.g., mimic a
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implementation have also been conducted on NB/BN, synthetic biology,
and RNAi mechanisms related to targeted drug delivery and other
42
medical interventions.
RNAi biomedical technologies could include molecular
modifications that enhance compound efficacy and gene-specific RNAi
43
targets, among other possibilities.
However, as with nanoparticleassisted drug delivery, the use of RNAi in drug delivery faces the
44
anticipated barrier of mistargeting. Although formidable obstacles for
45
both targeted siRNA drug delivery and gene therapy remain, many

typical therapeutic or imaging concentration). Id. at 2029–30. Greater nanoparticle size also
unexpectedly enhanced the degree of adsorption. Id. at 2030.
42. Regarding NB/BN, see, for example, Patrick Couvreur & Christine Vauthier,
Expert Review, Nanotechnology:
Intelligent Design to Treat Complex Disease, 23
PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 1417, 1419 (2006), for a list of many different possible NB/BN
solutions to current therapeutic challenges for diseases and medical conditions including
cancer, infections, metabolic diseases, autoimmune diseases, prevention of graft rejection,
pain treatment, and outstanding problems in gene therapy. The authors also suggest that an
inadequate understanding of how the immune system functions as a whole and the need to
identify specific cell targets for more selected performance are two of the research problems
that must first be solved before the NB/BN clinical solutions can be realized. Id. at 1440. Cf.
James L. McGrath, How Nanotechnology Will Revolutionize Bioseparations, 30 BIOMEDICAL
ENGINEERING SOC’Y BULL. 10, 10–11 (2006) (arguing that the use of nanofiltration to
facilitate reliable bioseparations of “[beta-2 microglobulin] from albumin at [the] flow rates
and protein levels used in blood dialysis[,]” thus reducing the need for more frequent dialysis
to combat the unacceptable loss of albumin, shows great potential, while also stating “that
nanofabricated membranes will eventually have the [necessary] strength and architecture” to
realize this potential) (emphasis added).
43. Cf. Helmuth H.G. van Es & Gert-Jan Arts, Review, Biology Calls the Targets:
Combining RNAi and Disease Biology, 10 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1385 (2005) (arguing
that RNAi biology can help identify disease-relevant genes and construct in vitro models, and
that “adenoviral siRNA libraries and disease-based cellular models [can be] used [to]
generate high-quality and functionally validated targets” for drug discovery).
44. See Sabrina Oliveira et al., Review, Targeted Delivery of siRNA, 2006:63675 J.
BIOMEDICINE
BIOTECHNOLOGY
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/JBB/2006/63675
(Because
the
functional mediators of RNAi are small interfering RNAs (siRNA), “siRNA should
therefore be targeted to three levels: to the target tissue, the target cell type, and the
subcellular compartment. Primary obstacles for achieving this . . . include competitive uptake
by nontarget cells, excretion in urine, degradation by nucleases, and endosomal trapping.’’).
However, the authors describe three categories of approaches to overcoming these barriers:
chemical modifications of siRNA, viral nucleic acid delivery systems, and nonviral nucleic
acid delivery systems. Id. at 2–6.
45. E.g., id. at 1, 6–7; Jens Kurreck, Review Article, 2006:83757 siRNA Efficiency:
Structure or Sequence—That is the Question, J. BIOMEDICINE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 1–6
(2006) available at http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/JBB/2006/83757; N.
Aronin, Target Selectivity in mRNA Silencing, 13 GENE THERAPY 509, 513 (2006) (discussing
possible toxic clinical off-target side effects of RNAi in gene therapy, such as changes in the
expression profiles of the non-targeted, but hit, mRNA, effecting RNAi-induced off-target
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strategies have been proposed to surmount these obstacles.

2. Medical Leaps in 20-to-40 Years: Vastly Improved Risk
Identification, Prevention, Diagnosis, and Treatment for Common and
Commonly Lethal Chronic Diseases
All three technologies have implications for various areas of
47
medicine, most notably oncology. However, for reasons that will be
explained below, truly revolutionary gains in premorbid risk
identification, individually tailored prophylactics, earlier and more
accurate diagnoses, and more efficacious and safer treatments will be
possible only after various scientific and technological barriers to
implementation are eliminated or circumvented. Arguably the most
promising of the three technologies from the medical perspective is
48
RNAi, especially for cancer, with particular promise noted for the
mRNA translational repression).
46. E.g., Oliveira et al., supra note 44, at 1–7; Kurreck, supra note 45, at 5–6.
47. See, e.g., Andrei Gartel & Eugene S. Kandel, RNA Interference in Cancer, 23
BIOMOLECULAR ENGINEERING 17, 17 (2006) (reporting that RNAi has become a potent tool
for effecting changes in gene expression via siRNA to determine cellular factors in
oncogenesis and tumor suppression and that RNAi aimed at oncogenes, both in vitro and in
vivo, has successfully inhibited tumor cell growth); Marta Izquierdo, Review, Short Interfering
RNAs as a Tool for Cancer Gene Therapy, 12 CANCER GENE THERAPY 217, 217 (2005)
(discussing the following promising RNAi methods for fighting cancer:
inhibiting
overexpression of cancer genes, blocking cell division via interference with cyclin E and
related genes, suppressing anti-apoptosis genes and thus facilitating cancer cell death, and
reducing the side effects of chemotherapy by interfering with multidrug resistance genes or
chemoresistance targets); Marguet et al., supra note 36, at 615 (describing the use of synthetic
biology for cell-based cancer therapeutics made by engineering mammalian cells, including a
description of one study in which melanoma patients received engineered cells by adoptive
cell transfer). The authors contend that “[e]ven though only [two] out of the [fifteen] patients
showed sustained regression, the work demonstrates the potential applicability of targeted
therapy using engineered cells.” Id.
48. See Chia-ying Chu & Tariq M. Rana, Translation Repression in Human Cells by
MicroRNA-Induced Gene Silencing Requires RCK/p54, 4 PLOS BIOLOGY 1122, 1133 (2006)
(reporting different effects of deleting helicase RCK/p54, a component of RISC, depending
on whether the RISC was miRISC or siRISC). Deleting RCK/p54 releases translational
repression via an imperfect complementary miRNA that acts through miRISC, but this
deletion does not influence the gene silencing effects of the perfect complementary siRNA
that acts through siRISC. Id. The authors argue that this finding provides mechanistic
insight, although they conclude that additional related research is needed on carcinogenesis
because “most targets of miRNA have not yet been identified.” Id. Relatively low miRNAinduced upregulation of the RAS protein has been associated with tumorigenesis in lung
cancer, altered RCK/p54 expression has been associated with the development of both
colorectal tumors and chronic hepatitis C, and “perturbations of either miRNA or RCK/p54
expression levels can have deleterious consequences for the cell.” Id. See, e.g., Gartel &
Kandel, supra note 47; Izquierdo, supra note 47, at 221–24. See also A DICTIONARY OF
BIOLOGY, supra note 27, at 570–72 (discussing the role of RISC assembly in miRNA and
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50

treatment of pancreatic cancer and breast cancer. However, overlap
51
among these technologies should foster synergistic collaborations.
Although the maturation of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi
may well lead to revolutionary gains in clinical medical intervention at
52
some point in the next twenty-to-forty years, a comparably pertinent
history of unmet promises leaves me skeptical that such gains will occur
anytime sooner. Over ten years ago, telomerase inhibitors were
predicted to offer great advances in cancer treatment via suppression of
53
telomeres. Telomeres are TTAGGG nucleotides repeated hundreds
54
of times on the tips of linear chromosomes. Each time that they divide,
normal somatic cells lose telomeric DNA as a function of age both in
55
vivo and in vitro.
In contrast, many cancer cells and cell lines
established from cancer maintain their telomere length by telomerase,
56
which synthesizes telomeric repeats. Telomerases are special reverse
transcriptases, which are enzymes that transcribe DNA from an RNA
57
template. In 1996, Michael Fossel was one of the enthusiasts of the
potential of not only telomerase inhibitors to cure cancer, but also of
telomerase enhancers to cure aging, in the then near future:
siRNA).
49. See, e.g., Hong Chang, Review, RNAi-Mediated Knockdown of Target Genes: A
Promising Strategy for Pancreatic Cancer Research, 14 CANCER GENE THERAPY 677, 677
(2007).
50. See, e.g., Ramesh Subramanian et al., siRNA-Mediated Simultaneous
Downregulation of uPA and Its Receptor Inhibits Angiogenesis and Invasiveness Triggering
Apoptosis in Breast Cancer Cells, 28 INT’L J. ONCOLOGY 831, 831, 836 (2006) (reporting that
the simultaneous transcriptional silencing of the “genes” that code for the UPA and UPAR
proteins can indirectly trigger apoptosis in breast cancer cells).
51. See, e.g., supra note 27.
52. The wide time interval required for stating a projection as a more-likely-than-not
probability, rather than just a possibility, reflects uncertainty about whether very good
allocations of resources, facilitative IP, and regulatory regimes will be in place. In Parts IV
and V, infra, I argue that the present heavy emphasis on the fast commercial development of
applications of academic research—in the United States, at least—will create path
dependencies in R&D leading to more modest gains and thus perhaps decades of unnecessary
delays in achieving truly revolutionary health-related benefits from these technologies. In
NB/BN, some experts predict that second generation nanodevices will be ready for clinical
use as early as 2009. See ONTARIO MEDICAL NANOTECH HORIZON, supra note 37, at 9 tbl.1.
But even if this should occur, it will likely be many years, if not decades, later that these
nanodevices will approximate their optimal clinical efficacy.
53. See infra text accompanying note 58.
54. See J.W. Shay & W.E. Wright, Review, Hallmarks of Telomeres in Ageing
Research, 211 J. PATHOLOGY, 114, 116 (2007).
55. See id. at 114, 116.
56. See id. at 117–19; MICHAEL FOSSEL, REVERSING HUMAN AGING 70 (1996).
57. See Shay & Wright, supra note 54, at 114.
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The work on telomerase inhibitors is more advanced than the
work on inducers; cancer therapy will precede therapy for aging.
Two families of telomerase inhibitors are currently undergoing
trials in animals. The first human trials cannot be far off: The
best estimates from those working with these compounds is
before 2000. A reasonable estimate is that if the rate of
development continues, we will have a clinically available cure
for most cancers by the year 2005 or soon thereafter. . . .
....
Treating aging with telomerase inducers would slightly
increase our chances of acquiring cancer[,] but we would also
treat ourselves with a telomerase inhibitor to kill cancers before
58
commencing telomerase therapy [for aging].
It is now shortly after Fossel’s predicted year for the “cure for most
cancers,” but there still is no cure for any cancer, via a telomerase
59
inhibitor or any other method (nor is there a cure for aging). These
additional historical reminders should help suppress excess hype about
translating the great promise that RNAi transcriptional and
translational silencing mechanisms have displayed in the lab to great
successes with either miRNA or siRNA in treating cancer patients in
the near future:
RNA interference has joined the family of gene-regulation
tools that already includes anti-sense RNA, ribozymes, and
triplex-forming oligos. Each of these [new] methods at the time
of its emergence was viewed as a near-universal solution to gene
inactivation problems. However, the discrepancy between
“promise and reality,” as well as the “growing pains” of
empirically discovered limitations and artifacts inspired a much
more balanced view of these techniques. In the face of the
growing popularity of experimental RNAi, one cannot help but
wonder what its limitations will be. So far, the issue of target58. FOSSEL, supra note 56, at 162–63.
59. Nonetheless, regarding malignant cancer at least, Fossel certainly appears to have
been on the right track. See Shay & Wright, supra note 54, at 118 tbl.1, 119 (reporting
aggregate ratios of (tested positive for telomerase activity)/(total tested) from hundreds of
studies over a recent five year period which examined the presence of telomerase activity in
different tissues—(1) normal tissue (367/2350); (2) preinvasive cancer (410/1391); and (3)
malignant cancer (3615/4304)—and arguing that “[s]ince telomerase activity is detected in
almost all advanced tumours [sic], the use of telomerase inhibitors may provide an effective
and novel approach to cancer therapy”).

REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED

3/16/2009 9:52 AM

142 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1

specific versus off-target effects is the most commonly
recognized problem of this approach. . . .
....
Importantly, “the nonspecific effects on gene expression are
dependent upon siRNA concentration in a gene-specific
manner.” Therefore, it is possible that the non-specific effects of
a studied siRNA and a randomly chosen “control” duplex could
differ substantially only because the two were delivered to the
target cells with different efficiencies, have different intracellular
stability, etc.
....
Unfortunately, the use of a single specific siRNA and a single
“targetless” control siRNA predominates in the literature. . . .
[W]e expect that more stringent controls . . . will become the
accepted norm. . . .
....
. . . While the general significance of microRNAs in oncology
60
has been recognized, a tremendous amount of work is still
required to produce a complete list of these molecules encoded
in [the] human genome, as well as to determine the biological
functions of each one of them. . . .
....
We expect that miRNA implicated as oncogenes will become
targets of therapeutic intervention. . . . Also, we will certainly see
gene therapy attempts aimed at restoring the tumor suppressive
miRNAs that are lost in cancer. . . .
....
. . . The attempts of siRNA-based therapy are certainly not
far away, [sic] however, they would face the same problem as the
preceding technologies: how to efficiently deliver the active
61, 62
sequence to a specific target in a body without side effects.
60. One example of the specific oncological significance of miRNA is the
aforementioned association between miRNA-induced upregulation of the RAS protein and
lung cancer. See Chu & Rana, supra note 48.
61. Ironically, one possible side effect is facilitating carcinogenesis: “Viral or nonviral
vectors transfect cells, allowing researchers to bypass systemic delivery challenges. Integrated
expression systems run the risk of producing cancer, however, and so are highly
experimental.” Charlie Schmidt, News Feature, Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket, 25
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 273, 275 (2007).
62. Gartel & Kandel, supra note 47, at 28–30 (citations omitted). There are many
anticipated barriers to efficacy, such as the mistargeting reported by Gartel & Kandel.
Another researcher also reports the irony that first generation RNAi drugs, based on
promising preclinical data, may be efficacious, but for “the wrong reasons”—i.e., reasons
unrelated to gene silencing—thus potentially retarding further RNAi development:
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In addition to reminding ourselves that predicted timelines for
medical applications of biotechnology have frequently gone unmet, we
should also find sobering recent research at the ENCyclopedia Of DNA
Elements (ENCODE) consortium and elsewhere which calls into
question many basic assumptions about DNA, RNA, and protein
regulation, creating a regulatory picture that is far more intricate and
63
multilayered than was long-assumed. One possible consequence of the
This is because of the potential for nucleic acids to stimulate innate immune
responses, which are known to be capable of antiviral, antiangiogenic, and
anticancer activities. . . . [T]he concept of therapeutic “isiRNAs,” that is, siRNAs
combining potentially synergistic gene silencing and immune-stimulatory activities,
has been discussed. It would certainly not be the first time, or even surprising, to
find drugs to be safe and efficacious, but working through an unanticipated
mechanism of action. Yet the realization that early RNAi drugs may have been
clinically successful because of these nonspecific effects rather than gene silencing
may negatively impact the perceived value of the RNAi platform, both because
these responses increase development risk and because there would be no need to
buy expensive RNAi IP when access to immune-stimulatory nucleic acids may be
obtained for much less.
Dirk Haussecker, Review, The Business of RNAi Therapeutics, 19 HUMAN GENE THERAPY
451, 459–60 (2008) (citations omitted).
63. See The ENCODE Project Consortium, Identification and Analysis of Functional
Elements in 1% of the Human Genome by the ENCODE Pilot Project, 447 NATURE 799, 799–
80 (2007) [hereinafter ENCODE PILOT PROJECT] (reporting the following among many
unanticipated findings of research on 1% of the human genome: (1) pervasive transcription,
with many transcripts linking distal regions with known protein coding sequences; (2) newly
identified non-coding transcripts, some of which overlap with chromatin structure and
protein-coding transcripts while others are in regions previously thought to be
transcriptionally silent; (3) chromatin structure predicting the timing of DNA replication,
while chromatin accessibility and histone modification patterns predict the presence and
activity of transcription start sites; (4) the identification of several new transcription start sites
that were surrounded by regulatory sequences with no upstream locational bias; (5) much
variation itself in the sequence variability of both the functional elements and the likelihood
that these elements were located in a structurally variable genomic region; and (6) lack of
constraint of many functional elements across evolution, suggesting that there is a large pool
of biochemically active, but neutral elements that provide no benefit to the organism).
Elizabeth Pennisi summarizes some of the most surprising results of this and related research.
Elizabeth Pennisi, News of the Week, Genomics: DNA Study Forces Rethink of What It
Means to Be a Gene, 316 SCIENCE 1556, 1556–57 (2007) (stating that the research reveals an
extremely different picture of DNA, RNA, protein, and their interactions than the one that
scientists have assumed for decades). All of the following long-held assumptions appear to be
wrong: (1) DNA is compact. No, human genes can be sprawling. (2) Much of the transcribed
DNA is translated. Again, no, because although protein-coding DNA comprises 2% of the
genome, 80% of the bases are being expressed. (3) Not much untranslated DNA turns up as
transcribed-only regulatory RNA. On the contrary, this is the fate of a huge amount of
untranslated DNA. Ms. Pennisi reports that these findings, combined with unexpected
distributions of exons and promoters, suggest that “a multidimensional network regulates
gene expression . . . [and] that because of this complexity, [some] researchers . . . [believe
that] RNA transcripts[, not DNA transcripts, should be viewed] as the fundamental
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unanticipated huge amount of expressed, non-coding DNA transcribed
as regulatory non-coding RNA (ncRNA) is creating a multi64
transcriptional knockout from a single RNAi sequence. ENCODE
and related recent research reveal enormously complex specific and
global interconnectivities between metabolism, mRNA abundance,
65
transcription, translation, protein production, and static architecture,

functional units of genomes.” Id. See Thomas R. Gingeras, Perspective, Origin of
Phenotypes: Genes and Transcripts, 17 GENOME RES. 682, 683 (2007) (arguing that “a byproduct of these [recent] studies [is] the unanticipated, but unanimous conclusion” that there
is a huge amount of expressed DNA that never turns up in proteins). Gingeras states that it
has been suggested that we temporarily refer to the large collection of newly identified
putative non-protein coding transcripts as “transcripts of unknown function” (TUFs) until
they are better understood. Id. See also Mark B. Gerstein et al., Perspective, What is a Gene,
Post-ENCODE? History and Updated Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 669, 676 (2007)
(proposing, in light of the diverse regulation and pervasive transcription highlighted by
ENCODE, this newer, more inclusive definition of a gene which expands on the idea that
genotypes make phenotypes: “A [gene is a] genomic sequence ([either] DNA or RNA)
directly encoding functional product molecules. . . .”). This assumes, at the molecular level,
that phenotype relates to biochemical function, because this assumption comports with
earlier concepts of a gene. Id. at 679. If several functional products share overlapping
regions, a gene is then the distinct union of all overlapping genome sequences coding for final
RNA or protein products. Id. at 676–77. Nonetheless, Gerstein et al. suggest that defining
“function” within their “gene” definition could be at best challenging and at worst impossible:
“High-throughput biochemical and mutational assays will be needed to define function on a
large scale. . . . However, we probably will not be able to ever know the function of all
molecules in the genome.” Id. at 679.
64. See, e.g., Alex Gaither & Vadim Iourgenko, RNA Interference Technologies and
Their Use in Cancer Research, 19 CURRENT OPINION ONCOLOGY 50, 50–53 (2006)
(discussing the use of RNAi to knockout genes associated with neoplastic growth).
65. See, e.g., Yohann Grondin et al., The Correlation Between Architecture and mRNA
Abundance in the Genetic Regulatory Network of Escherichia Coli, 1:30 BMC SYSTEMS
BIOLOGY 1, 5 (2007) (agreeing with ENCODE, the authors found that “[m]any factors
intervene in the dynamics of gene regulation,” including both “local factors such as the
sequence specificity of the transcription factor DNA binding site and global ones such as the
structural organization [sic] of the chromosomes”). Grondin et al. also found “a significant
correlation between architecture and mRNA” which they speculated to be due to selective
pressure to produce both enough regulator for phenotype production, but not too much
regulator because that would require “more regulator to be eliminated in order to generate
another phenotype.” Id. (citations omitted). The regulation is effected by DNA-binding
transcription factor proteins encoded by certain mRNA. Grondin et al.’s findings also
suggest a “significant correlation between the number of genes regulated by a transcription
factor and the abundance of mRNA that encode for this transcription factor.” Id. See also
Daniel H. Lackner et al., A Network of Multiple Regulatory Layers Shapes Gene Expression
in Fission Yeast, 26 MOLECULAR CELL 145, 145–54 (2007) (conducting a translational profile
of S. pombe cells which found multiple complex and unexpected genome-wide relationships
between transcription and translation, as well as between translation and mRNA
polyadenylation). Specific findings included these: (1) a positive correlation between mRNA
length and translational efficiency which puzzled the authors because mRNA is inversely
correlated with several other independent measures of translational efficiency; (2)
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with newly discovered ncRNA playing key regulatory roles under both
66
Answering such a dauntingly
normal and pathological conditions.
large and diverse range of complex, but important questions about the
67
human genome will also require improved methodologies.
Thus,
despite some patenting and some substantial technological
developments, the mechanisms of RNAi cannot be truly understood at
present because RNAi has to fit within this multilayered “portfolio of
68
biology puzzles” which will require much additional investigation.

deadenylation dynamics could explain “potentiation,” that is, “[i]ncreased transcription
would temporarily increase the proportion of long-tailed mRNAs, which in turn would lead
to increased translation,” which would provide an elegant global link between transcriptional
and translational change; (3) the strong possibility that intracellular mechanisms and
extracellular systems are congruent, if not coordinated, multilayered means of regulating
protein production; and (4) transcriptional and translational efficiencies may be correlated,
though not causally linked, due to “independent evolutionary selection at different levels of
regulation.” Id.
66. Cf. Aldo Pagano et al., New Small Nuclear RNA Gene-Like Transcriptional Units
as Sources of Regulatory Transcripts, 3 PLOS GENETICS 0174, 0175 (2007) (studying the
particular ncRNAs synthesized by RNA polymerase III which the authors hypothesize play
key roles in regulating protein-coding genes synthesized by RNA polymerase II).
67. Cf. Bradley E. Bernstein et al., Review, The Mammalian Epigenome, 128 CELL
669, 677–78 (2007) (reviewing the pertinent literature, emphasis is placed on methodological
advances needed to answer many diverse and immensely complex epigenomic questions, with
the conclusion that the enormity of the challenge should nonetheless not deter research
because “a concerted effort toward understanding the [human] genome would ultimately be
rewarded with a far richer understanding of how the genetic code is made manifest across an
incredibly varied background of developmental stages, tissue types, and disease states”).
68. Cf. Chu & Rana, supra note 48, at 1133–34 (Cautioning that while their findings,
combined with the results of previous research, “suggest an intriguing role for miRNA
function in development and carcinogenesis[,] . . . most targets of miRNA have not yet been
identified. . . . What determines the balance between active translation and repression of
mRNAs targeted by miRISC, and how cells control the specificity of this repression, are key
directions for future investigation.”); Zain Paroo et al., Review, Biochemical Mechanisms of
the RNA-Induced Silencing Complex, 17 CELL RES. 187, 189, 192 (2007) (After listing and
analyzing numerous broad unanswered questions regarding biochemical mechanisms of
RNAi—e.g., “[w]hat are the biochemical functions of genetically identified RNAi
components,” “[h]ow is RISC activity regulated”—the authors conclude that uncovering the
“influence of cellular signaling pathways on RISC activity and the contribution of RNAi to
physiological processes are [sic] critical in understanding the importance of small regulatory
RNAs in biology and disease.”).
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II. THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS TO NAVIGATE
THROUGH COMPLICATED AND UNCERTAIN LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRITORIES
A. The Patent Portfolio: The Main Unit of IP Value in All Three
Technologies
Universities and government agencies with innovations in nascent
life science technologies, such as NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi,
which have near-term applications, often build and maintain patent
portfolios to help them get good exclusive licensing deals with start-ups
that show promise for commercial development.
The
university/government agency-start-up alliance can then further develop
the portfolio to get and keep venture capital, with the hope that the
start-up or the portfolio itself will mature into a lucrative acquisition
target for a large pharmaceutical or biotechnology company. Patent
portfolio theory provides considerable explanatory power for how
patenting fits into commercial decision-making in all three
70
technologies.
The theory explains, at least in part, each of the
following: (1) the prevalence of heavy, early, and broad patenting; (2)
why government agencies, universities, and start-ups that obtain

69. I say “patent,” not “IP” portfolios, because virtually all NB/BN and RNAi
inventions will be patented. Although it is possible that some synthetic biology inventions
will be governed by copyright law, Kumar and Rai, in examining the constraints of statutory
construction, current practice in synthetic biology, and policy concerns, are skeptical that this
will be the case. See Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1763–64.
Synthetic biologists might argue that strings of DNA bases are comparable to source
code and that DNA strings could therefore also be covered by copyright.
Unlike software, however, the products of synthetic biology are not discussed . . . in
the [copyright] statute. Thus, a court that . . . wished to find that material
copyrightable would have to do so by analogy. Additionally, even if courts were
willing to make such an analogy, [17 U.S.C. § 101, the statute defining what is
copyrightable] . . . requires expressive choices. . . .
The construction of DNA sequences using base pairs that do not exist in nature
might allow significant room for expressive choice. . . . However, most synthetic
biologists working today, including those at MIT, are working within the confines of
the existing genetic code. This code constrains the expressive choices that they
make, making copyright protection less likely.
Beyond formal legal doctrine lies a set of policy concerns [given that patent rights
are available, adding an entirely new type of right might hurt innovation].
Id. (citations omitted).
70. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (making a somewhat similar, though more thorough and generally
applicable argument than the one I am presenting only for three technologies, that is, that the
patent portfolio represents the “true value of patents”).
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attractive exclusive licensing agreements typically have patent portfolios
with many diverse, but distinct, patents—the collective power of the
patents in the portfolio gives the portfolio leveraging might that is
largely independent of the value of any patent; (3) the diversity of
claims patented by a university or start-up company—the diversity
maximizes the range of related activity on which the university
investigators or start-up company can construct and develop research;
(4) both the high diversity and high quantity of patents in successful
portfolios give the patentee an insurance that is especially valuable
where, as in all three of these technologies, the pertinent science,
technology, and law are all highly uncertain and quickly evolving, that
is, an insurance against determinations of individual patent invalidity,
71
infringement, or lack of commercial value; and (5) the incentives for
patent thicket formation, as well as the associated increased risks of
holdup and bargaining failure, validate the concerns of some IP scholars
that the worsening patent thicket problem has increased the costs of
innovation.
Nonetheless, Robert Merges, a skeptic of the idea that software
patent portfolios are produced primarily for “defensive purposes” with
insufficient care given to individual patents, conducted an empirical
study in the software industry which reported high correlations between
at least some proxies of correlates of prosecution effort and firm
72
success. Although my Article is interested in natural science patents,
not software patents, Merges’ critique, though industry-specific, could
perhaps be generalized as an argument for the perceived greater
relevance of individual patents vis-à-vis patent portfolios.
I will first explain why I do not find Merges’ empirical critique of
portfolio theory compelling, then distinguish my portfolio theory

71. Regarding the potential litigation protection of nanotechnology patent portfolios,
compare R. Douglass Moffat, Public Markets and Nanotechnology Companies, in LYNN E.
FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE, INNOVATION, AND OPPORTUNITY 61, 61–62
(2006).
At this stage of nanotechnology development . . . intellectual property platforms
based on broad patents (often coming from academia) are the main assets behind
many companies. The applicability of this . . . [technology] could cut across many
markets and applications. Some firms have amassed broad IP by taking a portfolio
approach to early-stage commercialization. . . . Such diversification . . . makes sense
not only from a scientific point of view but also to lessen risks associated with
potential patent litigation. The patent landscape in nanotech might be likened to
the gold rush days, with [many] overlapping claims.
72. Robert P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the Software Industry 1, 23 (Aug.
1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=926204).

REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED

3/16/2009 9:52 AM

148 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1

somewhat from that of Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the serious methodological and
73
analytical problems in Merges’ study could be remedied in either a
revision of his manuscript or a subsequent study such that better
support is provided for his hypothesis that prosecutorial effort on
individual patents fosters firm success, aggregate effort applied to patent
portfolios could foster even greater firm success. In fact, Merges admits
that his study is consistent with this hypothesis:
[T]he results for the total number of patents held by the firm . . .
are somewhat puzzling. Only the square of this number is
significant. This latter result suggests that the size of a firm’s
patent portfolio does have an effect on the firm’s success, one
that increases in magnitude nonlinearly with the size of the
74
portfolio.
Merges’ study at most implies that the value of individual patents is
not negligible, which does not preclude the possibility that their value is
often far exceeded by that of the portfolios that they comprise. The
nonlinear relationship that Merges found (again, assuming arguendo
that this relationship would persist after the methodological and
analytical problems were remedied) could be due to the presence of

73. Id. at 16–37. The study has at least two analytical flaws: (1) causal inferences are at
least implied from individual correlates between proxies of prosecutorial effort and firm
growth for firms of various sizes, without any indication that ceteris paribus conditions have
been met; and (2) no rationale for choosing various proxies of prosecutorial effort is given.
The study also has at least three methodological flaws: (1) correlational coefficients and T
values are provided without indicating precisely which tests are used; (2) If the Pearson r and
a one-way T test were used, there is no indication that Kolmogorov-Smirnov or other tests for
normal distribution were used, which is particularly problematic given that,
patent counts exhibit relatively large means and heavy upper tails[, which] . . .
usually indicates the presence of overdispersion that is consistent with the presence
of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. It may also reflect the presence of
outliers that cannot be easily modeled by assuming smoothly distributed unobserved
heterogeneity. The consequences of these features of data for alternative modeling
strategies deserves further investigation because the regression models based on
several popular discrete distributions are unsuitable.
Jie Q. Guo & Pravin K. Trivedi, Flexible Parametric Models for Long-Tailed Patent Count
Distributions, 64 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 63, 63 (2002); and (3) data from several
privately held firms was not used because “erroneously identical numbers [were] reported for
revenues and employees from year to year. In such instances where firm data appeared
suspect, a new company was randomly selected to sample.” Merges, supra note 72, at 18.
These several replacements could have introduced selection bias.
74. Merges, supra note 72, at 21.

REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED

3/16/2009 9:52 AM

2009]NANOBIOTECHNOLOGY, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, AND RNAI 149

outliers, which would be consistent with my qualified portfolio theory
that I will now describe.
There are different versions of patent portfolio theory. My version
is that the value of a large and distinct, but related, group of patents
75
often functions as something of a super-patent, high in scale,
76
77
diversity, and quantity, as previously described by Parchomovsky and
Wagner. However, I also find Parchomovsky and Wagner’s description
of an inverse relationship between individual patent value and the
78
number of patents in a portfolio imprecise. Parchomovsky and
Wagner view quantity of patents in a portfolio as a mitigation of the
tradeoff between diversity and scale, as well as an explanation of the
apparent paradox that firms acquire individual patents at costs that
79
exceed their individual values.
I mostly agree that the pertinent firm benefit in a cost-benefit
comparison is the marginal value that the additional patent is expected
to add to the portfolio compared to the marginal cost of acquiring the
80
patent, but, unlike Parchomovsky and Wagner, I do not infer virtual
irrelevance of individual patent value in patenting decisions from this
portfolio-level cost-benefit assessment. Parchomovsky and Wagner
state that “[t]he overwhelming majority of patents have no value
whatsoever, and of those that have value, it is nearly impossible to
81
determine ex ante,” although they do not provide a very compelling
argument to support this assertion. Certainly, a major innovative
breakthrough with clearly foreseeable substantial clinical medical
applications would have a high probable value ex ante. Parchomovsky
and Wagner also do not adequately address the possibility of an
individual prospective or actual patent or claim of such high value that
to some extent it “transcends the portfolio” as measured by the
disproportionate attention the patent or claim receives from the patent
applicant or patentee and his or her competitors. Their statement that
although “individual patents may be of great independent value to their
inventors[,] . . . [i]nventors can increase the value of such patents by

75. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 31–37.
76. Id. at 37–41.
77. Id. at 42–43.
78. See id. at 42.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 42–43 (asserting that under patent portfolio theory, patenting decisions
are made with virtually no consideration of the value of individual patents).
81. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED

3/16/2009 9:52 AM

150 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1
82

constructing a portfolio around them” implicitly dismisses this
transcendent possibility, even though the distribution of the value of
83
patents is apparently quite skewed.
Perhaps an analogy between coaching a successful professional
football team and obtaining and maintaining a successful patent
84
portfolio is apt. Although the ultimate value of the 2007 New England
Patriots was their collective and coordinated breadth and depth of skills,
coaching attention paid to individual players was proportionate to
85
overall pertinent coordinated skill breadth and depth. Thus, to extend
the analogy, perhaps in an NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi
portfolio, there is a key Tom Brady quarterback patent within which
there is also a key throwing method claim. Much attention will be paid
to prosecuting that patent, with special care given to the written
description, enablement, and claim drafting for the throwing method.
That does not mean that the portfolio of coordinated skills taken as a
totality is not the best predictor of team success. The value of the
throwing method claim should thus be viewed primarily, though not

82. Id. at 9.
83. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75,
80 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents] (reporting that “the top [one]
percent of patents [are] more than [one] thousand times as valuable as the median patent.”).
84. This analogy is used partly because pertinent natural science firms do not put their
patent portfolio evolutions on display with explanatory footnotes. Moreover, because of the
nascent nature of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, firms have not yet gone through their
patent life cycles to allow for retrospective analysis. In addition, professional athletics teams
are well-known, allowing for rather transparent analogies. Although there are obvious
pertinent differences between professional athletics teams and life science firms, there are
many pertinent similarities as well, such as possible high commercial value that depends at
least partly on prudent planning to maximize the probability of success.
85. Note that I said 2007 New England Patriots, not 2007–2008 New England Patriots;
the Patriots certainly appeared invincible in 2007, but the New York Giants victory over the
Patriots in the 2008 Super Bowl proved that the Patriots could be beaten. The lesson for
near-term patent portfolio enabled commercialization may be that even the most promising
commercial ventures can backfire. Cf. Ann Thayer, Latest News, Harvard Licenses Nanotech
Patents:
Nano-Terra Gets Whitesides Nanofabrication Portfolio, 85 CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, June 11, 2007, at 14, [hereinafter Thayer, Harvard Licenses Nanotech
Patents] (arguing that Nano-Terra, a start-up that licensed an extremely promising patent
portfolio from Harvard in 2007, may be analogous to Nanosys, another nanotechnology startup founded in 2001 by Harvard chemistry professors Charles M. Lieber and Hongkun Park,
among others). Nanosys is reported to have had a similar approach to Nano-Terra for
commercializing nanotechnology and to have about 500 patents and patent applications,
many licensed from Harvard, Columbia University, MIT, and the University of California.
Like Nano-Terra, Nanosys’ scientific connections and IP attracted investors, only to
disappoint them when it called off a $100 million stock offering in 2004. Id.
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entirely, within the context of the Tom Brady quarterback patent. The
patent in turn should be viewed primarily, though not entirely, within
the context of the New England Patriots firm capital. I say not entirely,
because this particular throwing method claim and this particular Tom
Brady quarterback patent alone would have a high market value for
many teams, and thus neither has a negligible value divorced from the
Patriot portfolio.
Moreover, such particularly important individual patents and claims
can play distinct decontextualized roles, especially when they are even
more exceptionally valuable vis-à-vis the team. Team size, like quantity
of patents in the portfolio, does have the effect of greatly reducing this
possibility of the extraordinarily valuable outlier dwarfing the portfolio
such that the value of the portfolio could be viewed as more dependent
on it than vice versa. Thus, in a sport such a football, where team size is
large, player value is more contextualized. In a sport such as basketball,
with a maximum team size of twelve, the exceptional outlier like
Michael Jordan of the 1995 Chicago Bulls can have a value that exceeds
that of the remainder of the team. The team’s greater dependence on
him than vice versa could be calculated by the probable difference that
86
he alone made to the team’s exceptional performance. Thus, ceteris
paribus, the probability of an extremely valuable outlier patent or claim
may vary inversely with the respective number of patents or claims in
the portfolio. Extremely valuable outlier patents or claims are probably
rare in start-up firms with large patent portfolios, but there certainly are
dominant patents and claims with effects that exceed, if not dwarf, the
composite effects of patents and claims in the remainder of their
portfolios.
The very small percentage of utility patents that are litigated—or
87
even enforced throughout their potential twenty-year term —suggests
that the “extraordinary outlier” is rare indeed. Thus, my view is that
86. For example, but for Michael Jordan, it is very unlikely both that the team would
have won a record seventy-two games in the regular season and that the team would have
dominated the competition in the postseason.
87. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L. J. 435, 437 (2004); Lemley
& Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 83, at 75 (2005) (stating that the empirical
evidence indicates that of the 200,000 patents issued each year, 1.5 percent are litigated and
0.1 percent are litigated to trial); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES
202–03 (2004) (discussing two studies of biotechnology patent litigation rates, one finding six
per 100 biotech patents litigated, the other finding 1.9 per 100 biotech patents litigated). The
study reporting a 1.9/100 biotech patent litigation rate also reported that the litigation was
concentrated in “high-value patents,” which is consistent with the extraordinarily valuable
outlier that qualifies my patent portfolio theory.
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there are a few individual patents and claims of a distinct, high worth
that to some extent transcends the worth of the portfolios that contain
them. This qualified portfolio theory appears more credible than
Parchomovsky and Wagner’s categorical portfolio theory that makes
individual patent irrelevance the predominant effect of maximizing
portfolio diversity and scale via within-portfolio high quantity patenting
that mitigates the scale-diversity tradeoff. The relatively few utility
patents that are either litigated or enforced throughout the maximum
twenty-year patent term is consistent with my qualified portfolio theory
because, while my theory makes the portfolio the primary unit of value,
the theory also allows for extraordinarily valuable individual patents to
be carefully and vigorously protected via litigation and maximum term
enforcement. While no doubt there are many other considerations,
these considerations nonetheless appear to make a qualified portfolio
theory more credible than an absolute portfolio theory.
The rarity of litigation and full-term enforcement also create
additional problems for Merges’ prosecution effort-based critique of
portfolio theory. The most notable problem is the strong possibility that
this effort reflects ex ante ignorance about portfolio value more than it
does the pursuit of individualized, rather than portfolio-based,
approaches to commercialization. Once proportionate patent and claim
value in the portfolio as it pertains to more global commercialization,
research, and development prospects become clear, low attention to the
vast majority of individual patents is correctly predicted by my qualified
patent portfolio theory.
There are scholars who do not attempt to refute the apparent
paradox that firms acquire individual patents at costs that exceed their
individual values, although unlike Parchomovsky, Wagner, and myself,
they also do not use patent portfolio theory to explain the apparent
paradox. The following are among the theoretical alternatives to patent
portfolio theory presented as explanations: patents as signals, patents as
internal metrics, the lottery theory of patents, and defensive patenting.
However, Parchomovsky and Wagner effectively critique each of these
88
alternatives to patent portfolio theory.
88. See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70. Most persuasive among
their critiques are the following. First, signaling theory—patents signal to third parties
information about the patented invention and patenting firm—fails to explain the patent
paradox, because if the expected value of individual inventions is low, “it is not clear how
information about individual . . . [patents] is valuable to third parties.” Id. at 21–22. Second,
internal metrics theory—patents serve an intra-firm purpose, that is, measuring employee
productivity—also fails to explain the patent paradox. “Given the low private value of
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Moreover, the key value of patent portfolios is emphasized not only
by scholars such as Parchomovsky and Wagner, but also by
89
practitioners. Looking at the three technologies under discussion, I
will now show how portfolio-driven over-patenting contributes to both
thickets and low quality patents. Later, I will show the extensive
exclusive licensing predicted by patent portfolio theory.
B. Patent Thickets and Low Quality Patents: Consequences of Patenting
Too Early, Too Many, and Too Broadly in NB/BN, Synthetic Biology,
and RNAi
In various technology sectors in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and, to a
lesser extent, RNAi, patents that were too broad in scope were pursued
and granted too early and too often to too many inventors. In various
sectors in all three technologies, universities have been frequent
participants in this rush to patent many broad patents early. Several
factors foster thickets and low quality patents in these technologies: (1)
the complexities of the technologies; (2) insufficient attention to
patents, it seems problematic to equate patent filings with successful job performance.” Id. at
22–23. Third, defensive patenting theory—patents are “bargaining chips to negotiate with
competitors and to secure certain niches in the marketplace”—is only partly correct, because
the portfolio can act not only as shield, but also as sword, that is, defensive patenting theory
ignores “offensive uses conferred with patent rights.” Id. at 26–27. Fourth, lottery theory—
patents are generally of very low value, but “a few are of such great financial consequence
that they provide a sufficient incentive to inventors to obtain patents, based on the
infinitesimal hope of receiving an extremely high payoff”—assumes that inventors are “so
risk-seeking that they are willing to engage in an activity with a negative expected value.
However, the standard assumption in the patent literature . . . is that investors are actually
risk-averse.” Id. at 24–25. I would add the following critique of lottery theory: although my
qualified portfolio theory allows for the exceptionally valuable outlier claim or patent as an
exception to the generality that patents are purchased at costs that exceed their projected and
actual worth, I reason that this allows for fairly rare, intense, individualized protection via
careful prosecution, litigation, and full-patent term enforcement. This protection is due to
probable exceptional ex ante worth, probable or known exceptional ex post worth, or both.
The protection is not lottery-like gambling, either ex ante or ex post, on the very improbable
existence of an outlier claim or patent of exceptional worth.
89. In NB/BN, see, for example, Chinh H. Pham & Charles Berman, Intellectual
Property Policy and Impact, in LYNN E. FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE,
INNOVATION, AND OPPORTUNITY 105, 106 (2006) (Lawyers Pham and Berman argue that a
patent portfolio should “minimize the gaps that competitors can design around” and that the
“challenge of creating a strong and solid portfolio is equally applicable to the field of
nanotechnology.”). See also Bruce S. Itchkawitz, Developing an Effective Patent Portfolio, 3
NSTI-NANOTECH 344 (2006); Albert P. Halluin & Lorelei P. Westin, Nanotechnology: The
Importance of Intellectual Property Rights in an Emerging Technology, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 220, 226 (2004) (contending that “the key to the success of many
emerging technology companies will be how well-managed their intellectual property
portfolio is”).
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individual patents by some patent practitioners; (3) the perceived need
to claim as much new turf as soon as possible to defend against others
rushing in to patent portions of the nascent field which could possibly be
90
viewed as within the scope of one’s specification; and (4) the burden on
overworked and undertrained patent examiners.
A thicket is not equivalent to a group of invalid patents, infringing
patents, or both. In a thicket, numerous inventors can hold valid
patents that nonetheless create a high density of patent protection for
91
potential commercial products or services. However, this distinction
between thicketing as a barrier to commercialization and other legal and
technological barriers to commercialization does not mean that the two
are mutually exclusive. Some patents in a portfolio may add to thicket
density, while others in the portfolio may be infringing overlaps or be
invalid because of lack of utility, an inadequate written description or
enablement in the specification, or claim indefiniteness. Obviousness,
92
post-KSR, is another major hurdle to their validity. Patent thickets
could thus lead to various transaction costs that stymie innovation and
93
development.
Nonetheless, some commentators paint a picture of an uncluttered
biotechnology patent landscape. This view has been based on the
commonsensical argument that anticommons thicketing should be
viewed as the ratio of the number of patents in the field to the breadth

90. See Halluin & Westin, supra note 89 at 226–27. See also Bawa Commentary, supra
note 15, at 346–49. Cf. Raj Bawa et al., Protecting New Ideas and Inventions in Nanomedicine
with Patents, 1 NANOMEDICINE: NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGY, AND MED. 150, 155 (2005)
[hereinafter Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine] (expressing concern that the proliferation
of broad patents in nanotechnology could ultimately require litigation to untangle, “especially
if sectors of nanomedicine become financially lucrative,” and reporting a classic patent
thicket already “developing in the area of single-walled carbon nanotubes”).
91. See Gavin D. George, Note, What is Hiding in the Bushes? eBay’s Effect on
Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 557, 557 (2007)
(defining a patent thicket as existing “where there are numerous different firms holding
patents that are legally and technologically distinct, but overlap to cover a much smaller
number of actual or potential commercial products”).
92. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
93. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law
of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 902 (2006)
(arguing that the problems with biotechnology patents of broad scope are clear, namely,
difficulties in negotiating thickets of rights which effect inefficient exploration of some areas
of research, while also precluding the encouragement needed to solicit second-comers to find
new uses that build on patents in the thickets); Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra
note 90 (contending that the end result of the proliferation of nanotechnology patents that
lead to thickets is “a drag on the innovation process itself”).
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of the field. A thicket of course does denote high population density,
not just high population or high population growth. Thus, given the
breadth of all three fields, reports of industry-wide heavy patenting in
NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi do not cause as much concern as do
reports of the issuance of many patents in fairly narrow sectors within
the fields. Unfortunately, however, there have been reports of thickets
in fairly narrow sectors in all three fields: for example, in NB/BN, single95
96
walled carbon nanotubes; in synthetic biology, DNA-binding proteins;
97
and in RNAi, clinical medical therapeutics. Reportedly more cautious
PTO examinations of RNAi patent applications may make thicketing
98
less of a problem in RNAi. Yet the issuance of the first RNAi targetspecific patent to Sirna Therapeutics—covering any chemically modified
siRNA that targets the KK-gamma gene (implicated in several diseases
99
including asthma, arthritis, and cancer) —is viewed by one industry
100
insider as overly broad.
The problem of many overbroad patents is of particular concern—
especially in NB/BN—among foundational patents. One worry is that
such patents could stymie development by reducing access to
101
foundational building blocks.
Even in synthetic biology where
94. E.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure
of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (2007) (arguing that an
anticommons cannot be inferred only from a high number of patents in an industry, because
one must also consider the breadth of the industry).
95. E.g., Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90. Cf. Pham & Berman,
supra note 89, at 113.
If the USPTO were to allow broad patent claims it would restrict innovation by
allowing a few major players to control a large share of the field and crowd out
small, innovative players[;] . . . in some areas a restriction on innovation may soon
be created. This [may] be especially true for inventions involving carbon nanotubes.
There are currently an abundance of issued patents, many of which may be
overlapping in scope.
96. E.g., Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1758–60.
97. E.g., Schmidt, supra note 61, at 273–75.
98. See id. at 273.
99. Id. at 275. See also U.S. Patent No. 7,022,828 (filed May 28, 2002) (issued April 4,
2006).
100. Schmidt, supra note 61, at 275 (quoting an anonymous industry insider: “[w]e’re
sure the siRNA community will address these kinds of patents and unite to stop them”). This
insider also predicted “fierce fighting among companies when it comes to these [targetspecific] patents; this will be a future battlefield.” Id. (alteration in original).
101. Cf. Ted Sabety, Nanotech Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies
Promote Growth?, 1 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 262, 275–76, 278–79 (2004) (arguing that
because the cluttered patent landscape of nanotechnology resembles that of the radio
industry and that the government-compelled creation of RCA to pool radio patents may have
prevented thicket-induced slowed production, the government should proactively intervene
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commons of standard building blocks have been created, at least one
103
One
broad foundational synthetic biology patent has been issued.
scholar contends that “even assuming appropriate enforcement of
foundational patents, a proliferation of patents on basic parts and
devices
could
create
transaction-cost-heavy
thickets
or
104
‘anticommons.’”
105
Prior to PTO’s creation of a nanotechnology art division,
nanotechnology patent practitioners often claimed that allegedly nanoignorant patent examiners were entirely responsible for the issuance of
invalid nanotech patents, although the practitioners also commended
106
PTO attempts to remedy the alleged ignorance.
In contrast, some
academics alleged that practitioners pursued the maximal value of
patent portfolios—or simply patented early, broadly, and often—with
each new patent reducing the risk of a later validity or infringement
107
challenge.
The likely truth is that both examiner nano-ignorance and
practitioner pursuit of maximum patent portfolio value effected lessthorough-than-needed drafting of many individual claims and the
written description or the enablement parts of the specifications. The
lack of thoroughness caused the issuance of many overbroad and/or
overlapping NB/BN patents, many of which were foundational.
However, it is also probably true that neither the examiners nor the
practitioners deserve blame.
The examiners were extremely
overworked and not specifically trained in NB/BN, which may excuse

in nanotechnology by creating publicly funded foundational patents).
102. See, e.g., Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1763–65 (discussing synthetic biology
commons, including one at MIT, and one at Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS),
the latter being a patent-based commons). The MIT Registry contains more than two
thousand standardized parts; “[t]he MIT scientists involved with the Registry . . . are
sufficiently concerned that they have created a ‘BioBricks Foundation’ that might serve to
coordinate a synthetic biology commons.” Id.
103. See U.S. Patent No. 6,774,222 (filed Dec. 15, 2000) (covering molecular computing
elements, gates, and flip-flops).
104. See Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1747.
105. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
CLASSIFICATION
ORDER
1850
(2005),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/1850.pdf.
106. E.g., MORRISON AND FOERSTER, LEGAL UPDATES AND NEWS,
COMMERCIALIZING NANOBIO PRODUCTS: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES AND
REGULATIONS (2004), http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update1366.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2008).
107. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 33–36.
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them of some nano-ignorance. The practitioners were also obligated
to both their firms and their clients to provide the greatest overall value
to their clients in a highly competitive new technology where patent
portfolio value was the best approximation of that value. The
responsibility to fix the system needed to come from outside observers,
such as academics who can afford to be disinterested, as well as
Congress and the federal courts. It is thus most heartening that
academics, legislators, and judges have worked towards ways to reduce
patent thickets and increase patent quality. I will now describe how
particular doctrinal, statutory, and PTO rule changes may help reduce
the patent thickets and increase patent quality, as part of an assessment
of the changing legal, scientific, and technological landscapes. I will also
describe challenges that these landscapes create for practitioners
seeking to maximize patent portfolio value.
C. Prosecuting to Maximize Patent Portfolio Value When the Pertinent
Patent Law, Science, and Technology are All Uncertain and Quickly
Changing
In this section, I will address patent prosecution challenges in all
three fields that are experiencing rapid and uncertain legal, scientific,
and technological changes. I will focus first on how the higher
109
obviousness bar effected by KSR and its Federal Circuit progeny, as
108. See Uhlir, supra note 23, at 341. The multidisciplinary nature of the field also
appears to have made adequate examiner training in nanotechnology an arduous task.
Because the novelty of many nanotechnology inventions inheres in their unusual and/or sizedependent properties, the applicant’s capacity to be his or her own lexicographer encourages
one to define the inventions by property limitations over the prior art oneself. The
definiteness requirement for validity thus puts the examiner in the position of evaluating the
metes and bounds of nanoproperties that complicate the claim’s relationship to the prior art.
See id. at 345. Moreover, “in any given nanotech case, the chance that an examiner will
possess practical knowledge of the relevant technology is small. Thus, examiners will more
likely fail either to appreciate the significance of the properties exhibited by nanotechnology,
or to recognize these properties or their equivalents in the prior art.” Id. at 341.
109. Prior to KSR, there was a growing concern that both rejection rates during
prosecution and invalidity determinations during litigation were too low, largely because the
obviousness bar had become too low. Regarding invalidity determinations during litigation,
see, for example, Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (stating that “[i]n biotechnology cases, the Federal
Circuit has bent over backwards to find biotechnolog[y] inventions nonobvious, even if the
prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention”). But see generally
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of
Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007) (reporting, while the KSR decision
was pending, various results from his statistical study of Federal Circuit obviousness
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well as likely components of the Patent Reform Act, will make some
pertinent patent prosecutions less certain and some pertinent patent
validity challenges less risky.

determinations from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2005 from which he inferred both that
it is likely that the Federal Circuit has no bias towards nonobviousness and that, overall, the
“suggestion test,” or the TSM test, plays a small role in its obviousness determinations).
However, his statistical analysis has the following limitations which preclude support for
either inference. First, by temporally truncating the population parameter to four years,
Cotropia obtained a total population of 102 patents. Cotropia contends “while information
from the 1980s and 1990s is nice, the focus of the current debate is on the Federal Circuit’s
recent jurisprudence. It matters little what the court’s take on nonobviousness was twenty
years ago.” Id. at 927. But on the previous page he seems to contradict this blithe
justification for his temporal truncation—”the population of this study can be used to predict
the ‘population of all past and future . . . decisions[,]’”—implying that the validity of the
study’s findings could be checked by how they predict populations from the 1980s and 1990s.
Id. at 926 (alteration in original). Moreover, including the earlier patents would have allowed
for trend analyses. Most importantly, the earlier patents would have increased the
subpopulation sizes, thus increasing a type of statistical power, that is, the improbability of
committing a ß error in subpopulation comparisons. Consider the 0.1668 p-value for the
Fisher’s Exact Test which Cotropia obtained by comparing the Federal Circuit’s obviousness
determinations of appeals from lower court infringement cases with the determinations in the
lower courts. Id. at 933. If he had included the early patents to increase the N, the
differences most likely would have resulted in a p-value of less than 0.05. Second, Cotropia
contends that, because nonobviousness is a fact-intensive inquiry, it is difficult to determine
whether a decision is incorrect. Id. at 929. Although Cotropia states that such fact-intensive
inquiry does not appear possible on a large scale, by reducing his population parameters to
obtain only 102 patents, his own inquiry is medium-scale at best. Despite lack of knowledge
of the underlying facts, he tacitly assumes throughout the study, by testing repeatedly for
deviations from a 50% obviousness determination rate, that this rate indicates lack of bias
regarding obviousness. See, e.g., id. at 931–33. An analysis of the underlying facts and
pertinent statutory and case law could have indicated a point much higher or lower than this
for any subpopulation comparison. Thus, because Cotropia fails to place the data in its
proper underlying factual context, his inferences about the statistical significance of his data
are invalid. The absence of facts, combined with this assumed null hypothesis (i.e., judge
tacitly assumed unbiased if obviousness determinations are 50%), also creates a lack of
internal validity because the facts are confounders and hence his statement that “[s]tatistical
testing supports this causal observation” is false. Id. at 948. Third, Cotropia’s differential
treatment of decisions where all claims in a patent were determined valid or invalid (he
operationally defined the totality of the claims as one “patent”) vis-à-vis decisions where
some of a patent’s claims were determined valid and others determined invalid (he
operationally defined the valid and invalid ones as two distinct “patents”) introduced at least
some systematic bias. See id. at 925. Perhaps if he had supplemented this approach with
analyses of claims only, he could have compared resulting differences in ways that would have
detected the extent to which this bias alone invalidated the study, notwithstanding all of its
other aforementioned limitations. These limitations are stated in detail not only to support
the proposition that Cotropia’s data does not afford him the inferences that he draws from it,
but also to highlight just some of the many methodological problems that can occur in patent
metrics. In addition, a second proposition is supported, that is, that patent metrics studies
should be designed, conducted, and analyzed with extreme care.
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1. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. and Pertinent Likely Provisions of the
Patent Reform Act: Effects on Patent Prosecution
a. The Heightened Obviousness Bar for Post-KSR NB/BN, Synthetic
Biology, and RNAi Claims to Combinations
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. heightened the obviousness bar with a
110
unanimous Supreme Court opinion that serves as both an ex ante (i.e.,
pre-issuance) prosecutorial bar on obvious patent application claims and
an ex post (i.e., post-issuance) weeder of obvious patent claims.
According to the Federal Circuit’s teaching, suggestion, or motivation
(TSM) test for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention is
obvious if a hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in the art”
(PHOSITA) would have found a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine prior art references to make the invention. However, in April
2007, the Supreme Court held in KSR that the Federal Circuit’s use of
the TSM test was too rigid because it required that the prior art address
111
the particular problem that the patentee sought to solve.
KSR held
that the obviousness PHOSITA would not be confined to consider only
the elements designed to solve the problem because “[c]ommon sense
teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
112
primary purposes. . . .” KSR thus raised the obviousness bar to patent
validity.
However, KSR also held that intensive, explicit analysis is often
required to determine if there is an apparent reason to combine known
113
elements as manifested in a combination. Obviousness is not proven
merely by identifying in the prior art all of the elements of an
114
Nonetheless, the Court maintained that teachings
invention.
themselves need not be explicit and that a court should account for the
inferences and creative steps that the obviousness PHOSITA would
115
make.
Cautioning against “overemphasis on . . . published articles [or] the
explicit content of issued patents,” the Court opined that when there is
little discussion of obvious combinations, “it often may be the case that
market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1733 (2007).
Id. at 1741–42.
Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1740–41.
Id. at 1741.
Id.
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trends.” Design incentives and other market forces could be available
117
Likewise, if a technique used to
in a different field or endeavor.
improve one device would be recognized by the obviousness PHOSITA
as likely to improve similar devices in the same way, this recognition
would make the technique obvious unless the actual application of the
118
technique would be beyond the obviousness PHOSITA’s skill.
However, this prescription for inquiries into sources other than
published articles and issued patents was counterbalanced with an
emphasis on multiple patent review: “Often, it will be necessary for a
119
court to look at the interrelated teachings of multiple patents. . . .”
Thus, the Court emphasized the need for an expanded obviousness
analysis based on more patent and publication-related information, as
well as more non-patent and non-publication-related information. This
emphasis on an expansive inquiry came with a related warning not to
transform the general principle underlying the TSM test and Graham
into a rigid rule that limits obviousness inquiry, although, if such rigidity
was eschewed, both the TSM test and Graham could still be useful in an
120
obviousness analysis otherwise correctly applied.
The Court argued
121
that Graham itself prescribed a broad obviousness inquiry, and that
122
the material issue is “the objective reach of the claim.”
Stating bluntly that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of
123
ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” the Court, contrary to the
Federal Circuit, opined that proof that a combination was “obvious to
124
try” could make a claim for the combination obvious.
“Obvious to
try” can be shown by design need or market pressure to solve a problem
for which there are finite, predictable solutions that the obviousness
PHOSITA would have reason to pursue and could anticipate a
125
successful pursuit.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1740.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1741. See also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
121. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
122. Id. at 1742.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Recall also that KSR stated that market and design forces can come from a
different field altogether and can involve a claimed technique for a device that is different,
though similar, if the obviousness PHOSITA would have recognized using that technique to
make the similar device, and it was within his or her technical skill to make it. See id. at 1740.
Considered with statements made in KSR linking design and market forces to making
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The plethora of polymorphisms and multidisciplinary nature of
NB/BN and, to a lesser extent, synthetic biology and RNAi, will make
defining the obviousness PHOSITA for many inventions in these fields
126
difficult. Subsequent to KSR, the Federal Circuit in Daiichi Sankyo v.
Apotex, Inc. defined PHOSITA for an obviousness determination
narrowly as one of two types of specialists, rather than the general
127
practitioner used by the district court. The narrow definition caused
the Federal Circuit to overrule the district court on the question of
128
obviousness.
The Daiichi Sankyo court’s obviousness determination

something “obvious to try,” if there are a finite number of predictable solutions and the
obviousness PHOSITA would have anticipated a successful pursuit, these other statements
suggest that the finite, predictable solutions need not have been for the device claimed or
even in the same technical field.
126. Note that the PHOSITA legal construct is the hypothetical objective reference
person for not just obviousness analysis, but also utility, written description, enablement, and
claim definiteness analysis (thus making PHOSITA definitions essential to many
determinations of claim validity), as well as claim construction in infringement cases.
Although this is not the prevailing current doctrine, the range of obviousness PHOSITA
candidates should be commensurate with the best estimate for the variance from the level of
ordinary skill among practitioners in the art. For instance, if there is an extremely wide range
of skill in a well-defined art, then there are many candidates who would fit within the “normal
range of skill” and thus could be said to possess “ordinary skill.” The converse logic applies
when the range of skill is much narrower, leading to a much greater constriction of who
should count as possessing “ordinary skill.” Note, however, that there is more than one
PHOSITA per claim and that this logic as it pertains to innovative skill would not apply to
the written description or enablement PHOSITA. Burk & Lemley, supra note 109, at 1185–
90. The Federal Circuit has varied its PHOSITA constructions depending on the analytic
task required; for example, the PHOSITA for obviousness purposes has been constructed to
be,
not an especially inspired problem solver, as she is imagined to remain stuck in the
rut of conventional thinking. But the obviousness PHOSITA is still someone who is
trying to solve new problems. By contrast, the PHOSITA of the first paragraph of
section 112 shows no such innovative tendency, but is simply a user of the
technology.
Id. at 1190 (citations omitted). Thus, the level of “ordinary innovative skill within an art”
and, if I am correct, variance from this level of ordinary innovative skill, should be highly
pertinent in determining PHOSITA for obviousness analysis, but impertinent for written
description or enablement analysis.
127. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–59 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(considering that the inventors of a compound to treat ear infections were specialists in drug
development and ear treatments, not general practitioners or pediatricians, and that the
specification was directed to the same sort of expert, the Federal Circuit determined that the
district court erred in accepting a general practitioner or pediatrician as the PHOSITA for an
obviousness analysis, for the appropriate PHOSITA was either a scientist engaged in
developing pharmaceutical formulations and treatment methods for the ear, or a medical
professional who treats ear infections and is trained in pertinent pharmaceutical formulations
for the ear).
128. Given its narrowing of the obviousness PHOSITA to one of two types of
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was thus ultimately driven by its narrow PHOSITA definition.
The patent prosecutor in a highly complex technology like any of the
three fields here may thus be caught in something of a bind. On the one
hand, he or she must attempt to avoid a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 written
description rejection by making the written description precise enough
for this PHOSITA to know that the inventor was in possession of the
claimed invention at the time of the application. On the other hand, he
or she must also try to avoid a 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection by keeping
the written description from being so precise that it leads to a very
narrow obviousness PHOSITA and a holding that the invention is
obvious. There will often be yet another major consideration—
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1—that tips the scales towards
precision. For the enablement PHOSITA to be able to make the
invention, enablement must include precise language, ideally with clear
links to both the written description and the claims, thus implying that
all three should be written precisely. This may create an additional risk
of an obviousness determination, post-KSR and post-Daiichi Sankyo,
but it will not necessarily create a much greater risk. On the other hand,
considering the complexity of the three fields, deliberate vagueness
could greatly risk an enablement rejection. Thus, as usual, it is better to
err on the side of being too precise than not precise enough.
Precision and thoroughness are key for prosecutors, examiners, and
judges alike. Implicit in KSR’s emphasis on secondary characteristics is
the need to apply the TSM test, if at all, in an expansive and flexible
manner. The Court’s construction of an obviousness PHOSITA with
not just ordinary skill, but common sense and ordinary creativity,
prescribes thorough fact-based investigation. Although ultimately a
legal determination, obviousness, of course, often also requires a very
fact-intensive inquiry. When the Court opines that an obviousness
determination often necessitates examining multiple patents, not just
129
the most clearly relevant patents and printed publications, as well as
130
market forces and design trends, the Court is basically saying, do not
truncate the factual inquiry because many facts aside from what may
appear at first review to be the most pertinent prior art and printed
publications may be relevant. Note that the many polymorphisms in

specialists, the Federal Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could only find that either
specialist would have seen the invention as obvious and thus it was obvious as a matter of law.
Id. at 1257, 1259.
129. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
130. Id. at 1740.
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NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, even if they are not combinations,
may still be products of interdisciplinary research and thus, in patent
prosecution and patent validity litigation, be especially likely to require
131
a thorough examination of information culled from various sources.
Although it may be troubling for the patent prosecutor with a
debatably non-obvious invention in any of the three fields, from a policy
perspective, Daiichi Sankyo is another helpful weeder of invalid claims.
The narrowness of the obviousness PHOSITA in Daiichi Sankyo would
appear to require, for instance, that the obviousness PHOSITA
pertaining to virtually all NB/BN be a person of ordinary skill in the
pertinent interdisciplinary niche within nanotechnology and
biotechnology. Such a person in one’s exact subdiscipline is, inter alia,
far more likely to find one’s claim obvious than is a “general
132
nanotechnologist” of ordinary skill.
Returning to the perspective of
patent prosecution, Daiichi Sankyo appears to make O’Neill et al.’s
encouragement of nanotechnology inventors and researchers to work
closely with their patent agents and attorneys to provide “thorough
specification[s] that disclose[] all reasonable variations of their
133
nanotech[nology] inventions” even more compelling by mitigating the
obviousness concerns associated with my precision prescription above.
In doing so, the applicant fosters a broad construction of the
obviousness PHOSITA. Thus, patent prosecutors are best served by
making the enablement, claim(s), and written description precise, while
also emphasizing in the written description the breadth of the pertinent
arts.
The high level of ordinary skill in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and
RNAi could, following KSR and Daiichi Sankyo, make the invention
131. Cf. Stephen J. MacKenzie, Supreme Court’s KSR v. Teleflex Decision (2007),
http://www.wcsr.com/default.asp?id=118&objID=241&print=1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2008)
(arguing, in the context of KSR’s effects on litigation, “[i]n chemical, electrical, and
biotechnology cases, a more in depth obviousness analysis may be needed since predictability
of results may not be easily apparent, the function of known prior art elements usually
changes when chemically combined, and the background knowledge of a person of ordinary
skill in the art may span several disciplines”).
132. Daiichi Sankyo may outdate some previous commentary on the enablement
challenge that assumed that the PHOSITA would be broadly defined as a nanotechnologist
of ordinary skill. Leonard P. Diana, et al., Untangling the Nanothreads Between the
Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 41, 47
(2007) (contending that despite very high knowledge and expertise in nanotechnology, a
PHOSITA would have, paradoxically, relatively low knowledge and expertise because of
nanotechnology’s highly interdisciplinary nature).
133. Sean O’Neill et al., Broad Claiming in Nanotechnology Patents: Is Litigation
Inevitable?, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 29, 39 (2007).
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appear more predictable and technologically feasible compared to what
was known at the time of the invention. Prior to KSR, in the 1990s at
least, the probability that federal district courts would find a claim
obvious appears to have varied inversely with the complexity of the
134
art.
Because of their generally greater complexity, biotechnology
claims may have been less likely to be held obvious in this decade, even
when the inventions involved relatively minor additions to the prior art.
However, KSR’s holding that if an invention is “obvious to try,” it is
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, even absent identification of the
problem or any written prior art, will probably make similar, relatively
minor additions to the prior art in NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi
claims more likely to be held obvious.
In regards to the three fields addressed in this Article, there have
been several cases in biotechnology that are related to synthetic biology
and RNAi, and a few cases related to some form of NB/BN as well.
However, thus far, there has been only one case that specifically
addressed a nanotechnology patent and no cases that have specifically
addressed a synthetic biology or RNAi patent.
In the sole
nanotechnology case, In re Kumar, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ (BPAI)
determination that several claims in a patent application for aluminum
135
oxide particles of submicron size were obvious.
The Federal Circuit
rejected the BPAI’s own identification for the first time of underlying
particle size values (i.e., the size values had been previously identified
by no one, including no party during prosecution or the BPAI appeal)
to make an obviousness determination. The court stated that if an
obviousness rejection “is based on overlapping values in the prior art,
identification of the values deemed to overlap is material to the
rejection. In this case[,] the overlapping values were identified for the
first time in the decision of the Board, and are not themselves set forth
136
in . . . any . . . reference.” The Federal Circuit remanded the case for

134. Cf. Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness: An
Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, STAN. TECH. L. REV., July 2006, ¶¶
22, 41, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/McEldowney-Obviousness.pdf (reporting from
his empirical study of 321 published federal district court opinions (the study is limited in that
it did not look at Federal Circuit opinions) that reached the question of obviousness on 407
utility patents). Although complexity of the art was not associated with an obviousness
holding in the 1970s, it was in the 1990s; “simple patents [were] more likely than complex
patents to be invalidated as obvious in the 1990s.” Id.
135. In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
136. Id. at 1367.
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the declarants to provide additional information, armed this time with
137
the BPAI’s identification of overlapping numerical values.
However, KSR, with its emphasis on the problem not having to be
spelled out for the obviousness PHOSITA, may at least partly eclipse
Kumar. KSR emphasized that this PHOSITA has not only ordinary
138
139
skill in the art, but also ordinary creativity and common sense. An
issue post-KSR, for a case such as Kumar, would thus seem to be not
whether the numerical values generated by the examiner, the BPAI, or
federal judge were ever before the applicant, but rather, whether the
obviousness PHOSITA would have used ordinary skill, common sense,
and ordinary creativity to derive the same finite overlapping range.
KSR would not appear to require this PHOSITA to have been
presented with the numerical values.
Kumar also criticized the BPAI for mishandling the declarative
140
evidence and applying the incorrect enablement test for obviousness.
Kumar stated that the correct test is whether the prior art enabled the
obviousness PHOSITA to make and use the invention. That is, would a
patent reference have enabled this PHOSITA to produce particles of
141
the size and distribution claimed by Kumar? Although if the prior art
is enabling, it “teaches,” making the invention obvious, if the prior art is
not enabling, it may or may not “teach away.” “Teaching away” is a
form of secondary evidence involving unexpected results that KSR
142
discussed as being valuable in establishing non-obviousness. Thus, in
nanotechnology patent applications, prosecutors should emphasize
unexpected results, especially size-dependent unexpected results due to
quantum effects and the absence of an enabling method of producing
nanoscale materials with certain properties. Demonstrating such
unexpected results would still show non-obviousness post-KSR.
Prosecutors should also emphasize the value of declarative teaching
away evidence of uncited art post-KSR.
Regarding post-KSR obviousness issues with chemical and
biotechnology claims that may be pertinent to synthetic biology and
RNAi inventions, the following statement and prediction are probably
correct: “A virtually per se rule of patentability for new biotechnology

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1369.
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
See id.
See In re Kumar, 418 F.3d at 1368–69.
Id. at 1369.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
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entities is set in the 1995 Deuel case. Deuel has been the subject of
heavy criticism [in] the scholarly community. . . . It may be expected that
in the wake of KSR there will be a renewed challenge to the viability of
143
Deuel.”
Just weeks after KSR, in Ex Parte Kubin, relying on KSR’s
144
“obvious to try” reasoning, the BPAI took a direct shot at Deuel.
Deuel had held that prior art DNA cloning methods and a partial amino
acid sequence for a protein encoded by the disputed patented DNA did
145
not suffice to make that DNA obvious.
But then, just weeks after
146
Kubin, in another case, Takeda Chemical Industries, the Federal
Circuit rejected an argument analogizing “obvious to try” to KSR.
However, Takeda Chemical Industries should not be misinterpreted as
either an implicit rejection of Kubin or an implicit reaffirmation of
Deuel; it was neither, fitting in nicely with not only Kubin, but also
147
Pfizer and KSR. Unlike in Kubin, Pfizer, and KSR, the invention in
Takeda Chemical Industries was one of “millions of possibilities” among
148
the pertinent options.
Clearly, when KSR said that there should be
143. Harold C. Wegner,
KSR-Induced PTO Obviousness Practice Changes, 20-21 (2007), available at
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/070529_KSR_PTO_Obviousness_Practice_(Wegner).
pdf (discussing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
144. Ex parte Kubin, Application No. 09/667,859, 8–9 (B.P.A.I. 2007) (precedential
opinion).
145. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d. at 1558–59.
146. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
147. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
148. Ex Parte Kubin held that a rejected claim to a nucleic acid sequence encoding a
cell surface marker protein was obvious because there was a limited number of ways to
isolate the protein that the obviousness PHOSITA would have had reason to try, expecting at
least one to be a success. Ex parte Kubin, Application No. 09/667,859 at 9. In Takeda
Chemical Industries, the Federal Circuit held that “in cases involving new chemical
compounds, it remains necessary to identify some reason that would have led a chemist to
modify a known compound in a particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a
new claimed compound.” Takeda Chem. Indust., 492 F.3d at 1357 (emphasis added). The
Federal Circuit therefore rejected the appellant’s “obvious to try” argument because it failed
to show how the obviousness PHOSITA would have chosen the prior art compound to
modify the compound from the “hundreds of millions of possibilities.” Id. In addition to
these two post-KSR cases, in Pfizer, decided shortly before KSR, the prior art also gave the
obviousness PHOSITA far-fewer-than-astronomical options in a genus—fifty-three
acceptable anions—from which to select a few, including the claimed anion. Pfizer, 480 F.3d
at 1363. The question of “limited options” often appears as a decisive motif running through
what may otherwise be seen as disparate opinions. Prosecutors may often wish to preempt an
“obvious to try” rejection by emphasizing in the written description the uncertain feasibility,
multitude, and diversity of options that existed at the time of the invention, using the prior
art, declarations, and valid and reliable evidence of design needs or market pressures. The
prevalence and prominence of “limited options” motifs in all of these opinions on
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limited options, the Court did not intend the finite limit to be so
astronomical. In Kubin, Pfizer, and KSR, in contrast, there were truly
149
limited options.
Given the potential of all three nascent technologies to enable more
precise drug delivery, one wonders if KSR will have a warming or
chilling effect on large pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
that have been somewhat risk-averse regarding these technologies.
These companies have preferred not to develop the technologies
internally, but instead acquire the start-ups with the most promising or
150
“disruptive” patent portfolios.
This question may be commercially
critical for particular government agencies and university inventors, as
well as their start-up exclusive licensees, because pharmaceutical patent
expirations will also cause the drug market to open considerably in the
151
near future.
Many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies look to make
what they can of combinations, new uses, or new methodologies related
obviousness make such work important as part of a thorough and careful written description.
149. Some commentators have nonetheless misinterpreted KSR in criticizing Kubin.
See, e.g., Eric K. Steffe & Elizabeth J. Haanes, Patent Board Challenges Federal Circuit to a
Deuel, IP LAW 360, July 27, 2007, at 3, http://64.237.99.107/media/pnc/4/media.354.pdf.
(criticizing Kubin for not providing “any identified predictable solutions, let alone a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions to the problem. Where KSR may have opened
the door, nothing in the KSR opinion mandated dispensing with the need for at least some
structural similarity in the prior art.”) (emphasis added). But Kubin argues compellingly that
because combining the prior art references would have led to a limited number of
conventional methods for isolating the claimed cDNA for producing a protein implicated in
the human immune system and various human diseases, the obviousness PHOSITA would
have a motive to try these methods with the reasonable expectation that at least one method
would be a success. Kubin effectively relies on KSR’s statement that where there are a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions within the obviousness PHOSITA’s technical grasp
and he or she has a motive to solve the problem and reason to anticipate success, the success
was due to common sense and ordinary skill and thus obvious to try. See Ex parte Kubin,
Application 09/667,859, at 8-9; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).
Ordinary common sense, ordinary creativity, and flexible and expansive obviousness inquiries
were strong motifs running through KSR. Requiring identification of a particular similar
structure in the prior art—when the obviousness PHOSITA could use ordinary common
sense and ordinary creativity to combine the prior art references that included limited
conventional methods one of which would most likely solve the problem—imposes precisely
the sort of narrowness and rigidity that KSR rejected for obviousness determinations.
150. See MICHAELA PLATZER, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION,
PATIENT CAPITAL: HOW VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DRIVES REVOLUTIONARY
MEDICAL INNOVATION 9 (2006) (reporting that “many large pharmaceutical and life science
corporations consider young, venture backed companies to be their de facto R&D pipelines.
For this reason, venture-backed companies often are acquired for their disruptive
technologies by these larger organizations”).
151. See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 154.
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to known drugs, however, pursuing “extended patent coverage for their
key commercial products” as part of their “Patent Life Cycle
152
Management[] [strategy to] maximize[] [the] profitability of drugs.”
KSR could certainly be applied to challenge such extensions as obvious,
153
particularly by combining its “obvious to try” analysis with the
154
reasonable probability of success analysis in not only KSR, but also
155
Pfizer. However, the chilling effect of such prospective challenges on
these companies is unlikely to be very big precisely because the
companies are already risk-averse. These companies often acquire
start-ups with portfolios that include highly valuable patents and claims
on somewhat “disruptive technology” where “unexpected results” and
other “secondary indicia of non-obviousness” can be convincingly
156
shown.
Thus, if NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi offers a
combination, new use, or new method for a drug with an expiring
patent, and the risk-averse drug company is willing to acquire the patent
portfolio containing the combination, use, or method allowing for an
extension of patent coverage, the extension would probably withstand
an obviousness challenge.
b. Possible Forthcoming Statutory and PTO Rule Changes That Would
Help Further Weed Out Patent Thickets and Increase Patent Validity:
Creating a One-Year Post-Grant Opposition Period, Reducing the
Litigation Estoppel Effect of Inter Partes Reexaminations, and
Empowering the PTO to Make Rules That Limit Continuations
In addition to the case law discussed in the previous section, at least
two components of the House version of the Patent Reform Act, the
157
Senate version of this act, or both, and a third reform proposed by the
158
PTO, are likely to be effective ex post patent thicket weeders and

152. See Steven R. Ludwig & Matthew E. Kelley, Pharmaceutical Patent Life Cycle
Management After KSR International v. Teleflex, VENABLE LLP, May 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.venable.com/docs/pubs/1684.pdf.
153. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
154. See id.
155. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
156. Cf. PLATZER, supra note 150.
157. The House version has passed. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th
Cong. (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007). The Senate is still debating its version. Compare
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Jan. 24, 2008), with Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong (as referred to S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Sept. 25, 2008).
158. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed.
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patent quality enhancers: (1) creating a one-year post-issuance period
when validity challenges can be made without incurring the expense
159
associated with reexamination or litigation; (2) reducing the litigation
160
estoppel effect of inter partes reexaminations; and (3) empowering the
161
Allowing one year for post-issuance
PTO to limit continuations.
validity challenges at the PTO would spare potential challengers the
monetary expenses, opportunity costs, and lengthy periods of
uncertainty often associated with lawsuits and, to a lesser extent,
162
reexaminations.
Striking the estoppel language “could have raised”
from “raised or could have raised” in 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) could also make
inter partes reexamination a more frequent choice for a validity
163
challenger who also wants to preserve litigation options. The first two

Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter PTO Proposed
Limit to Continuations as a Matter of Right].
159. See H.R. 1908, sec. 6(f)(1), §§ 321–22; S. 1145, sec. 6(e)(1) §§ 321–22. But see S.
3600, sec. 5(c). The more recent Senate Bill creates a more complicated two-period postgrant challenge system. During the first nine-month post-grant period, petitions to cancel
claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) or (3) may be made. S. 3600, sec. 5(c), §
321(b). During a second post-grant period, commencing the later of nine months after
issuance (or reissuance) or the termination of a first-period proceeding, petitions may be
made based on prior art in patents or printed publications to cancel claims as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. S. 3600, sec. 5(c), § 321(c).
160. See H.R. 1908, sec. 6(d). But see S. 1145, sec. 6(a); S. 3600, sec. 5(b)(1). In
contrast to the House version, both Senate versions would eliminate inter partes
reexaminations, leaving in their stead only the post-grant review procedures referenced in the
previous footnote. See S. 1145, sec. 6(e); S. 3600(c), sec. 5(c).
161. See PTO Proposed Limit to Continuations as a Matter of Right, supra note 158,
at 48–49. But see Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (presenting a successful
challenge of the PTO’s proposal which effected a preliminary injunction on implementing the
proposal). However, the PTO’s appeal of Tafas is currently pending at the Federal Circuit.
Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Identifies New Applicability Date
of Certain Provisions in “Claims and Continuations” Final Rule (Aug. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/08-33.htm.
162. In addition to reducing the ex post expense of a validity challenge, the one-year
period for post-issuance validity challenges at the PTO may also indirectly reduce hindsight
bias if the obviousness issue is then taken to the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court, 2006
Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 375, 383 (2007) (concurring with fellow scholars’
prescriptions for post-grant PTO review). The law review editors argued that a more robust
review would not only alleviate concerns about overissuance, but could also proactively
combat judge hindsight bias by providing independent obviousness assessments by both the
examiner and pertinent experts during the review. Id. If the obviousness issue remains
unresolved, post-KSR, a judge employing common sense might be more likely to defer to the
PTO’s robust review. Id.
163. Cf. JULIE A. HEDLUND, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
FOUNDATION, PATENTS PENDING: PATENT REFORM FOR THE INNOVATION ECONOMY 11
(2007), available at http://www.itif.org/files/PatentsPending.pdf (arguing that this estoppel
language made third parties reluctant to use inter partes reexaminations even after Congress
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changes listed above would also allow third parties to participate more
in patent examination and review, which scholars providing in-depth
164
analyses of possible reforms to the patent system have recommended.
The last change listed—empowering the PTO to limit
continuations—would encourage the rigorous initial prosecution of
claims, by discouraging the filing of what could be an endless series of
continuation-in-part applications (CIPs). Such CIPs can perpetually
broaden claims so long as each new CIP’s claims are supported by the
initial specification in a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 sense and otherwise comply
with pertinent provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78.
Having a CIP as a virtually certain prosecutorial option can thus add
both sloppiness and perpetual uncertainty to ultimate claim scope.
Allowing the PTO to restrict continuations may reduce a patentee’s
ability to protect all variations of its combination product. However,
obviousness doctrine, rejuvenated by KSR and its Federal Circuit
progeny, will protect against many attempts to design around initially
claimed combinations with distinct, but obvious, derivatives.
2. Just-Now-Learning that Human Genetic Regulation is Not What
We Thought: Specific Consequences for Prosecuting NB/BN, Synthetic
Biology, and RNAi Patents
As noted in Section II.B.2, new research at ENCODE and elsewhere
convincingly shows that much of what we have long thought was true
about nucleic acid regulation of protein production and activity at the
mammalian cellular and extracellular levels is incorrect. ENCODE et
al. could have effects on the written description, utility, enablement, and
definiteness of nucleotide and amino acid sequence patents. At first
blush, most troubling for prospective patentees of sequences would
appear to be continuing to establish utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The

had allowed for appeals to the Federal Circuit).
164. E.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, 1 CAPITALISM
& SOC’Y 17, 22-23 (2006) (arguing compellingly that because the presumption of patent
validity is necessary to reduce start-up precariousness that can deter investment, this
presumption must remain, but that this presumption must also be made reasonable by an
increase in patent quality effected by a change in the rules associated with inter partes
reexamination). If all parties are given meaningful opportunity to request reexamination on
the basis of any relevant facts they have—with an opportunity to appeal and make any
argument later in court not specifically made in the reexamination—then this presumption
might become reasonable, because the greater attractiveness of inter partes reexamination,
backed up with meaningful possible appeal, means a patent must either withstand a rigorous
post-issuance test, be of too trivial worth for its validity to matter, or be too clearly valid to
elicit a third party challenge. Id.
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need for a specific, substantial, practical, and credible utility could
certainly be difficult to meet if many of the most basic roles that the
165
sequence was long thought to play are called into question. Moreover,
calls from scientists for a highly accessible genetic commons that
extends upon the genomic commons created by the Human Genome
166
Project, combined with the Federal Circuit’s most likely no-longertenable discrete definition of “a gene” as “a chemical compound, albeit
167
a complex one,” makes one wonder if patent law regarding the
regulation of nucleotide sequences needs a major overhaul. In addition
to concerns about whether the sequences as we now understand them
168
meet the utility requirement of § 101, there are science policy issues,
as well as concerns about whether the definiteness requirement of § 112,
¶ 2 is met, given the current uncertainty regarding just what a gene is.
Until the mechanisms controlling human transcription and translation—
and their extracellular regulating links that allow for genome-wide and
proteome-wide extraordinarily complex, seemingly multiple context
dependent determinants of phenotypes which were found in the
research at ENCODE et al.—are far better understood, this uncertainty
will persist.
Consider the possible definiteness problems associated with claim
one of Verdezyne’s recent patent licensed to the University of
California. The claim is putatively for “[a] method of synthesizing a
DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide” which involves iterative DNA
deconstruction and reconstruction via globally optimized division,
165. Cf. Posting of Kevin Noonan to Patent Docs, What’s ENCODE’d in Your
Genome
Isn’t
a
Collection
of
Genes,
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/06/whats_encoded_i_1.html (June 18, 2007,
22:51 EST) (arguing that because ENCODE implies that the traditional definition of the
mammalian gene as a discrete template for translation is wrong because transcription is more
generalized, the utility of Express Sequence Tags (ESTs), which were thought to be
differentially expressed in tissue, and thus, reflect an event specific to a cell, tissue, or organ,
is, “at best, highly questionable”).
166. Cf. Roger D. Klein, Editorial, Gene Patents and Personalized Medicine, 4(3)
PERSONALIZED MED. 237, 239–40 (2007) [hereinafter Klein, Gene Patents] (Contending that
“the heritable and somatically acquired genetic traits influencing most drugs’ physiologic
effects are likely to be polygenic. In the future, the inherent encumbrances that gene-related
patents impose . . . [are likely to] be magnified, as advancing knowledge necessitates the
acquisition and integration of information regarding possible variants in multiple genes that
act in concert[,]” while implying that an expansion of patent-eligible subject matter to include
medically related genotype-phenotype correlations would also deter this necessary
acquisition and integration.).
167. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991).
168. See, e.g., Klein, Gene Patents, supra note 166, at 238–40.
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thermodynamically controlled self-assembly, and reconstitution. First,
forget ENCODE et al.’s research for a second. The claim’s apparent
excess breadth—exacerbated by the use of the open-ended word
“comprising” in the first claim upon which the next forty claims
170
171
depend —could make it vulnerable to a written description challenge
and/or an infringement challenge. Now recall that ENCODE et al.’s
findings imply that nucleotide sequence expression culminating in
172
particular amino acid sequences is highly variable. If this implication
is correct, then claim one of Verdezyne’s patent could possibly be
vulnerable to a definiteness challenge due to an inherent ambiguity in
the phrase “encoding a polypeptide” because the method may not
encode a polypeptide under all conditions. On the other hand, because
claims are given their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted” by the definiteness
173
PHOSITA, courts could find this variability acceptable if the method
encodes a polypeptide under at least one condition and, considering the
specification, this PHOSITA would construe the method as encoding
the polypeptide.
3. General Strategies and Tactics in Patent Prosecution that Maximize
Patent Portfolio Value in NB/BN, Synthetic Biology, and RNAi
Given both the thickets looming in various sectors in all three
174
technologies and the breadth of scientific and legal uncertainty, patent
prosecutors in any of these technologies must do extensive and intensive
searches of both the printed prior art and the evolving state of the art
prior to actual prosecution. Such thorough research is needed to ensure
that the specification includes as broad and precise a written description
of the art and as clear and thorough an enablement for the claims as
possible. KSR makes it imperative that claims be crafted to avoid
excess breadth vis-à-vis both the prior art and all non-prior art

169. U.S. Patent No. 7,262,031 (filed May 21, 2004).
170. “A method of synthesizing a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide, comprising .
. .” ‘031 Patent claim 1.
171. Unless the claim was accompanied by a highly pertinent and broad written
description.
172. See ENCODE PILOT PROJECT, supra note 63.
173. In re Am. Acad. Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
174. Although legal uncertainty persists, it appears much more likely—given KSR, its
BPAI and Federal Circuit progeny, and both the House and Senate versions of the Patent
Reform Act—that the cumulative impact of legal changes affecting prosecution will lead to
more, not fewer, hurdles to establishing and proving patent validity.
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knowledge culled outside of printed publications and patents (especially
information pertaining to market forces and design incentives).
However, maximal valid breadth by definition is not excessive.
Thus, the prosecutor should obtain the broadest claims—considered
collectively as parts of a much greater whole that is one’s ultimate
patent-related focus, i.e., the patent portfolio—that one’s other patents,
175
the prior art, outside knowledge, and the specification will allow.
Maximal patent protection means careful portfolio building with many
broad, non-overlapping patents that maximize diversity and magnitude
of protection in (a) particular area(s) of the technology. Although CIPs
176
and other continuations may be limited by new PTO rules, neither
these rules nor the House or Senate version of the Patent Reform Act
does away with broadening reissues, which could be filed within two
177
years of issuance to prevent potential competitors from designing
around one’s inventions. Claiming less than maximal valid specification
breadth prevents optimal portfolio-level patent magnitude and diversity
and inadvertently invites claims for designs around inventions protected
by the portfolio. Such inadvertent invitations will almost certainly be
accepted in the three intensively and extensively patented technologies
discussed here. In addition, note that the Patent Reform Act may also
178
eliminate “interferences.”
Regardless of the ultimate status of “interference” or “prior inventor
challenges,” litigating challenges will continue to be expensive
distractions from patent portfolio buildup in alliance with business and
179
science development. Moreover, although this will be addressed more
fully in the next part of this Article, the quality of further development
and the value of an ultimate acquisition by a large pharmaceutical or

175. Considering also that the claims must be given the broadest reasonable
interpretation that the definiteness PHOSITA, after assessing the specification, would give
them. In re Am. Acad. Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364.
176. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
177. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
178. Both House and Senate versions replace “interference proceedings” with
“derivation proceedings.” H.R. 1908, sec. 3(j); S. 1145 sec. 3(j); S. 3600, sec. 2(j). However,
under all current versions of the Act, the PTO Director could nonetheless still institute a
proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) when a dispute arises between different individuals
regarding the right to patent the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 101. H.R. 908, sec. 3(i)(a)(C); S.
1145, sec. 3(i)(a)(1); S. 3600, sec. 2(i)(a)(1).
179. Cf. Roger C. Hahn, The Evolving Landscape of Patenting Biotech Inventions:
Terra Firma or Terra Incognita?, 30 BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING SOC’Y BULL. 7, 9 (2006)
(“A huge drain on resources is required to resolve patent disputes once they have initiated in
comparison to the modest costs required in building an effective IP portfolio.”).
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biotechnology company will be largely driven by real and perceived
patent portfolio quality. Validity and infringement battles can make a
start-up appear unstable to licensees, venture capitalists, and potential
exit companies that could acquire the portfolio, albeit in a much more
developed form.
III. DESIGNING AND EXECUTING ROADMAPS THAT MAXIMIZE
COMMERCIAL VALUE: USE OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS, LICENSES,
VENTURE CAPITAL, AND ACQUISITIONS
A. Early Thorough Integrative Research Planning that Culminates in a
Multi-Dimensional Modifiable Roadmap
The composition of an effective roadmap for these three
technologies should usually begin at the point that commercialization
appears to be a realistic possibility. At that point, business executives
and consultants as well as IP and other legal advisors in a government
agency, university (typically in or associated with the technology
transfer office of the agency or university), or start-up company where
these innovations will most likely occur should begin to collaborate on a
180
route to commercial success.
Among the many considerations is whether a research-based
alliance—e.g., a cross-government agency or cross-university alliance—
via the Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement
(CREATE) Act should be formed. The benefit of such an alliance is
that it would reduce patent-related competition and the possibility of an
181
obviousness rejection if two research teams in separate government
agencies or universities are engaged in parallel research and care is
182
taken to realize CREATE’s capacity to circumvent this rejection.

180. Cf. Posting of John D. Carroll to Fierce Biotech, Nanotech is Promising, but Faces
Hurdles, http://www.fiercebiotech.com/node/8774/print (Sept. 21, 2007 6:59 EST) (reporting
that although the efficient manufacture of nanotherapeutics will be difficult, small companies
have the flexibility to produce innovations for new therapies). Id. Market demands,
however, would require the involvement of large pharmaceutical companies. This is
consistent with a trend towards initial innovation occurring in small companies that are
subsequently acquired by large ones.
181. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000).
182. OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403–04 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“[S]ubject matter derived from another not only is itself unpatentable to the party who
derived it under § 102(f), but, when combined with other prior art, may make a resulting
obvious invention unpatentable to that party under a combination of §§ 102(f) and 103.”).
Compliance with this holding is essential. Prior art only under § 102(f) that was not
commonly owned by both research teams at the time of the invention is not disqualified as
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Enhanced cross-fertilization, collaboration, and consolidation of
scientific and technological forces are all likely benefits. However,
reduction of troll-like holdup by the other agency or university is an
unlikely benefit. Although neither the agency nor the university may be
a manufacturing entity in the traditional sense, it is also true that neither
183
is the idle extractor of rent that makes for a troll.
Another major consideration is the probable market value of
innovations given numerous factors that are to varying degrees
184
technology-specific and even technology type-specific.
The
assessment of probable market value is necessarily speculative, but
should nonetheless be pursued to generate best educated guesses for
incipient roadmap construction. It is essential to consider all reasonably
possible roadblocks on various anticipated routes toward
commercialization.
Foreseeable possible roadblocks include: (1)
scientific ignorance (e.g., unsolved pertinent puzzles uncovered by
ENCODE and other research); (2) failure of future research to
185
186
surmount or circumvent anticipated and unanticipated technological
barriers; (3) barriers created by technology-type concentrations of
187
patent thickets; (4) pertinent known and unknown distributions of
patent ownership which could stymie licensing negotiations and
prior art under § 103(c) (and thus not under §§ 103(c)(2) and (c)(3)). Id. Thus, information
not contained in printed publications and patents, yet available outside the university,
government agency, or start-up prior to collaboration, would not be disqualified as prior art.
Patent prosecutors must coordinate the full disclosure of information from both groups when
forming a joint research agreement under CREATE.
183. See Marc A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629–30 (2008).
184. Cf., e.g., Bawa Commentary, supra note 15, at 346 (discussing factors specific to
nanomedicine).
Several variables will determine whether advances in the laboratory will translate
into multiple opportunities for the consumer.
Early-stage nanomedicine
commercialization will be hampered by large-scale production challenges, high
production costs, the public’s general reluctance to embrace innovative medical
technology without real safety guidelines, a scarcity of venture funds, few near-term
commercially viable products, a well-established micrometer-scale industry, the
pharmaceutical industry’s reluctance to embrace nanomedicine, and the absence of
clear regulatory guidelines.
185. Just one of many expected barrier types: barriers to effective nucleic acid
sequence target delivery in RNAi.
186. New pharmaceuticals and other new medical interventions both have long
histories of unanticipated adverse clinical side effects, including, perhaps most notoriously,
the lethal side effect of gene therapy for an eighteen-year-old man receiving the therapy in a
clinical trial. See Couzin & Kaiser, infra note 289.
187. For example, in NB/BN, an apparent thicket in single-walled carbon nanotubes.
See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90.
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discourage venture capital; (5) thickets effected by clusters of patent
189
(6) environmental and safety concerns regarding
expirations;
190
biological pharmaceuticals; (7) the number of pending and issued
patents on similar inventions as part of a review of competitors’ patent
191
portfolios; and (8) repeated citation by others of potential unlicensed
192
competitor patents as signs of their licensing potential.
Once these roadblocks are considered, additional pertinent prior art,
market forces, and design incentives should be reviewed, and all
possibly valid, non-infringing, and commercially valuable patents that
193
could be obtained for one’s inventions should be identified.
It may
seem premature to begin working on a modifiable roadmap of such
complexity based in no small part on estimated prospective patent
values, based in turn on preliminary research only, with not a single
actual provisional or national patent application yet filed. However,
envisioning the entire commercialization process extremely early gives
the process some initial direction and identifies precisely what must be
done when using deadlines that are as ambitious as current conditions
allow. Although these timeframes are modifiable, strong incentives
should be built to meet them; speed of development is of course
impressive to licensees and venture capitalists, as well as pharmaceutical
188. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992–93 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup].
The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force the
downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be very powerful.
These threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially in cases where the
injunction is based on a patent covering one small component of a complex,
profitable, and popular product.
189. Regarding expirations of pharmaceutical patents, compare Bawa et al., Protecting
Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 154, for an argument that commercialization in
nanomedicine will be driven partly by the expiration of drug patents.
190. Cf. K. John Morrow Jr., Gauging Nanobiotech’s Promise Realistically: Biotech
and Pharma Firms are Taking a Wait-and-See Approach, 26 GENETIC ENGINEERING &
BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWS,
Dec.
1,
2006,
available
at
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem_print.aspx?aid=1953&chidl=2
[hereinafter
Morrow, Gauging Nanobiotech’s Promise] (reporting the concerns of representatives of
industry and investment management firms that potential environmental and health hazards
of nanotechnologies have not been adequately assessed).
191. Cf. Pham & Berman, supra note 89, at 113 (stating that the patent system can be a
marker of innovation, with numbers of issued patents and pending patent applications
helping one ascertain potential competitors and “the relative positions of intellectual
property”).
192. Cf. id. at 114.
193. Cf. Couvreur & Vauthier, supra note 42, at 1440 (arguing in the context of
nanotechnology that successful collaboration requires managing IP very carefully at the
beginning of the business relationship).
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and biotechnology companies considering acquisition targets.
The first very-near-future deadline should then be set for the
formation of a multidimensional, modifiable roadmap for maximal
commercial development. Such a roadmap could include the following:
(1) projected pertinent scientific developments, with evaluations of
different developmental paths in turn linked to probability estimates of
“conditions precedent,” that is, path-dependent necessary conditions for
the developments to occur; (2) projected technological developmental
trajectories as effects of the scientific developments in one above; (3)
projected technological developmental trajectories that are not effects
of the scientific developments in one above; (4) projected evolution of
pertinent patent law; (5) projected evolution of pertinent food and drug
194
195
law; (6) projected evolution of pertinent environmental law; (7)
identification of IP issues generally, most notably any pertinent
innovations in synthetic biology that should be subject to copyright law,
196
not patent law; (8) projected patent portfolio formation and evolution
as effects of attempts to maximize scale and diversity considering one
through six above as well as the preliminary research on roadblocks
discussed in Part II.C.3; (9) identification and evaluation of
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that may want to acquire
a projected patent portfolio at some defined date (e.g., exactly five years
hence); (10) identification and evaluation of current and future public
funding as well as various possible future sources of venture capital;
and, if this commercial roadmap should occur in a government agency
or university, rather than a start-up, (11) identification and evaluation of
possible start-ups for exclusive licensing negotiations (with a near-future
deadline for determining how to proceed with a first choice potential
licensee).
Much, if not all, of this information will be difficult to quantify via

194. Cf. PLATZER, supra note 150, at 5 (“Life science start[-]up companies face special
challenges given the high degree of risk and the cost and time it takes to bring these
innovative health care therapies and technologies to the marketplace. An unpredictable
regulatory environment weighs heavily in the calculation of investment risk in a new
technology.”).
195. Cf. Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 349 (2007) (recommending, because risks are uncertain yet potentially huge,
notification and labeling for all nanomaterials and additional screening, bonding, and
monitoring for free form nanomaterials). Thus, the uncertainty of regulatory approval is
compounded by the uncertainty as to what regulations will be in effect when particular
nanomaterials are putatively ready to be commercialized. Id.
196. Although recall that it appears unlikely that synthetic biology will be subject to
copyright. See Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1763–64.
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probability estimates, although best educated guesses should be
197
In addition, scientific,
provided with estimated confidence intervals.
technological, and legal uncertainties that defy categorical probability
analysis may be quantified via traditional analysis of set intersection,
possibility analysis that allows for gradation of set membership, or
198
both. The great degree of uncertainty regarding technological growth
199
could also allow for contingency plans based on possible obsolescence.
197. For example, the probability that technological development x will occur by a
future date could be presented as a probability, p(x), with a probability of the probability
estimate being correct presented as its confidence interval. This probability of a probability,
p(p(x)), represents the likelihood that the probability measurement is correct and is thus a
gauge of “certainty,” c(x), that is, “predictive power.” Maximal predictive power would exist
when c(x) = 1, that is, when p(x) = 0 or 1 and when p(p(x)) = 1, because complete certainty
would exist when one both predicts that x will either happen (p(x) = 1) or not happen (p(x) =
0) and one also has complete confidence in this prediction (p(p(x)) = 1, CI = 0). On the other
end of the continuum, absence of predictive power would exist when c(x) = 0, that is, when
p(x) = 0.5 and p(p(x)) = 0, because maximal uncertainty would occur when one has no reason
to believe that x will either happen or not happen (p(x) = 0.5), nor any reason to believe in
any particular probability of x happening (p(p(x))=0, CI = 1). Thus, under maximal certainty,
p(x) = 0 (0, 0) or 1 (1,1); under maximal uncertainty, p(x) = 0.5 (0,1). Put differently, one’s
probability that a technological development will occur by a future date is a subjective
assessment that reflects one’s perceived knowledge of what is likely to happen. Thus, for
instance, given all that one knows about the science, technology, and law that could affect
R&D in synthetic biology, one might predict how likely it would be for a eukaryotic cell to be
completely synthesized from scratch in twenty years. In contrast, one’s probability of the
probability that the eukaryotic cell will be synthesized then is one’s perceived knowledge of
the degree to which one’s knowledge of pertinent science, technology, and law is complete.
Thus, if the second-order probability is low, one lacks confidence, due to perceived ignorance,
that the first-order probability is correct. Thus, a second-order probability could be
calculated to determine the extent of additional research one might need to do to minimize
this ignorance. The many rapidly evolving dimensions on the roadmap require that it be
designed so that it can be modified when one or more projected dimensions miss the mark.
However, much effort may be required to minimize uncertainty at the start, because initial
investments can be modified only to a point without uprooting technological developments.
Initial investments may effect entire sequences of additional investments which anticipate
that the technological developments will follow paths that approximate their initial projected
trajectories. Cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 87, at 56–57.
[N]ot all ideas for innovations are known when investment decisions must be taken,
and thus there can be regret. Any investment has the potential to set in motion a
whole sequence of related investments that will entrench a technology. . . . The right
interpretation of efficiency must account for options on expected future
development. Since the future path of development has a stochastic element, the
decision maker must have a subjective view of what is likely to happen, and with
what probabilities, and then calculate economic welfare as an expected value. If this
seems too demanding, try to formulate an alternative. Compared to what?
Id.
198. For a seminal discussion of possibility analysis, see L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8
INFO. & CONTROL 338 (1965).
199. Cf. JACK ULDRICH, INVESTING IN NANOTECHNOLOGY 251 (2006) (arguing that
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Even when obsolescence appears improbable, if it also seems
reasonably possible, given that utility patent protection begins with the
200
date of issuance and ends twenty years from the date of application,
obsolescence should be addressed for the degree to which it is expected
to reduce the patent portfolio’s exit value at acquisition.
At first, the best plan is to increase patent portfolio magnitude and
diversity in a specific market, with a large number of distinct, but related
patents that mitigate the intra-market magnitude-diversity trade-off.
The importance of market specialization at the incipient development
201
phase in a start-up has been particularly noted in nanotechnology.
Premature cross-market development is generally cost-prohibitive. The
small size of most nanotechnology start-ups, despite the potential crossmarket applicability of their technology, makes incipient developmental
202
efforts across markets overextensive.
Even in nanomedicine, where
companies are developing a wide range of apparatuses, manufactures,
203
and methods, small start-up size necessitates development in one
nanomedical market only. As the nanomedical start-up matures, crossmarket diversification would become more feasible, allowing for
additional mitigation of the risks created by long R&D timelines,
204
205
FDA and EPA hurdles, and possibly unforeseeable hurdles. The
unforeseeable hurdles could include limited niche marketability due to
unanticipated side effects with many patients as well as other limits to
clinical use due to expense, causing third-party payer non-coverage
various nanoscale products and devices such as carbon nanotubes, nanoparticles, and
quantum dots could have very short commercial lives, because although they may fetch a
premium price at first, prices may drop as production scale increases and more competitors
get into the field, allowing for both upgrades and entirely new products and services).
200. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
201. ULDRICH, supra note 199, at 21 (arguing that nanotechnology start-ups “should
be able to subcategorize the specific market [that] they are about to enter (e.g., electronics,
tools, biotechnology)”).
202. Cf. id. at 21–22 (arguing that although a nanotechnology company often has
potential applications in many markets, market realities dictate that it focus on one field first
and develop a specific product for that market because nanotechnology companies, especially
the small start-ups, need strategic focus to succeed).
203. See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 156.
204. See, e.g., NANOTECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION,
NANOTECHNOLOGY
19–28
(2007),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/taskforce/report2007.html.
205. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Invites
Public Participation in Development of Nanotechnology Stewardship Program (Dec. 18,
2006),
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/0edb5f39e2ed
3c428525720b00629872!OpenDocument.
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because the nanomedical intervention is not substantially superior to
much cheaper therapeutic options.
B. Maintaining and Modifying the Roadmap to Maximize Commercial
Value
Once the roadmap is created—because it depends on the eleven
206
dynamic variables in Part III.A —it should be frequently viewed for
adjustment in research, development, and business emphases, from the
pre-exclusive licensing stage down the road to acquisition. The
roadmap—and the patent portfolio within it which will often be a
dominant force in determining routes toward exclusive licensing,
financing, and acquisition—must be viewed as dynamic entities.
Virtually constant attention and frequent, though not major, changes in
direction should be expected depending on existing and projected
changes in these entities. Although radical directional change could
connote instability that would often reduce anticipated commercial
gains, more modest fine-tuning projects an impressive degree of
diligence that would bode well for commercialization.
C. Using the Patent Portfolio to Facilitate Commercial Development
Building and maintaining patent portfolios with many nonoverlapping patents which maximize both magnitude and diversity is but
one part—albeit a crucial part—of the legal enablement of commercial
207
development in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi.
The patent
portfolio must be part of an integrated legal and commercial strategy
with well-defined developmental paths clearly plotted on the
208
multidimensional roadmap. The leveraging power of the portfolio in
206. See supra Part IV.A.
207. Cf. Michelle Dipp et al., Keeping It Real With Investors, BIOENTREPRENEUR
(2006),
available
at
http://www.nature.com/bioent/building/financing/012006/pf/bioent899_pf.html (arguing that
IP fosters start-up transition from birth to growth, seed money is needed for initial patent
applications and licenses to ensure a strong IP position, small start-ups must have the tools to
defend their IP from infringers of all sizes, and no industry depends on IP as much as the life
sciences industry).
208. Cf. Gabor Garai & Andrew S. Baluch, Integrated Legal Strategies for Combination
PULSE,
April
2007,
at
3,
available
at
Biomedical
Products,
THE
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/4046/ThePulse_April07.pdf.
Just as a nanotechnology combination product unites these three physical components—drug,
device, biologic—so too are the regulatory, intellectual property (IP), and business law issues
increasingly related with regard to the legal aspects of these products. To succeed in the
marketplace, the innovators of combination products must be armed with an integrated legal
strategy.
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the context of the multidimensional roadmap to commercialization can
209
be formidable. However, because patent clusters have already formed
in sectors within all three technologies, navigating these clusters will
210
211
often be crucial for exclusive licensing, financing, and commercial
212
and technological maturation into an attractive acquisition target.
D. Exclusive Licensing
Investor analysts have stressed the value of strategic partnerships in
213
these emerging technologies.
Although exclusive licensing (often
between university innovators and start-ups that can build on the
innovations) has become an increasingly attractive first step to
commercialization, “holdups” that potentially stymie innovation can
214
exact a considerable toll.
Thus, it is imperative to try to foresee
potential holdups and ascertain if an attempt at a non-obvious
anticipatory design-around is needed. A non-obvious design-around
would effectively circumvent the claims in the potential holdup.
Similar mitigation strategies are an important part of the bilateral
bargaining between a university (or government agency) patentee and a
start-up exclusive licensee. If it has downstream rivals, “an early

209. Cf. Schmidt, supra note 61, at 273.
210. Presumptively valid and broad patent protection in any of these technologies can
be the key ingredient to obtaining a good licensing deal. For instance, Sirna’s broad patent
portfolio in RNAi made it very attractive for Merck—which, like many pharmaceutical
companies, has generally been very cautious about licensing or acquiring patent portfolios in
these new technologies—to license the portfolio. See id.
211. Cf. Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 156 (Asserting that
patents are critical for start-up financing: “investors are unlikely to invest in a start-up that
has failed to construct adequate defenses around its intellectual property. In fact, patents
generally precede funding from a venture capital firm.”).
212. Cf. Bawa Commentary, supra note 15, at 346 (Arguing that investors in
nanomedicine and pharmaceutical companies consider patent issues to be among the most
important issues that they will consider in evaluating a prospective investment).
213. Regarding nanotechnology for instance, see ULDRICH, supra note 199, at 27:
“[b]ecause many nanotechnology start-ups are small, they will need assistance in getting their
product to market. For this they will often need partners.”
214. Cf. Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1758 (“[A] crowded patent landscape creates
the possibility of ‘holdup’ by a previously unknown patent holder who emerges only after
others have invested large sums of money . . . to the extent that patent rights holders rely
upon reach-through royalties to secure revenue, standard economic theory predicts that
product output by the improver will be suboptimal.”) (citations omitted). However, trolls do
not just holdup big companies with deep pockets: “Start-up companies are easy targets for
holders of weak patents of ambiguous scope because of the fragility of their funding and the
time-sensitivity of their business plan.” Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent
System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007).
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licensee will actually benefit from agreeing to conditions that will
preserve the patent holder’s position in subsequent negotiations with
other downstream firms, since the early licensee benefits if subsequent
215
licensees (its rivals) must pay higher royalties.”
Several high profile
exclusive licensing deals between universities and start-ups in all three
technologies imply that these deals are one of the preferred first
commercial moves for many universities with promising near-term
216
innovations.
E. Maximizing Patent Portfolio Value to Obtain and Maintain Venture
Capital
Virtually all start-ups in these three research-intensive fields will
need venture capital, and the number of patents, combined with the
magnitude and diversity of patent protection, are key to getting that
venture capital. Though widely recognized as critically important,
getting venture capital is by no means easy to get, and even if a start-up
receives venture capital, success is not guaranteed. A large percentage
of biotechnology start-ups have not had a successful exit either as an

215. Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 188, at 2007. See also Garai &
Baluch, supra note 208, at 4 (“[E]ach additional license will decrease the manufacturer’s
incentive to market the combined [biomedical] product. . . .”).
216. Examples of major exclusive licensing deals in all three fields in the past two years
include the following. First, in synthetic biology, Condon Devices exclusively licensed
synthetic biology technology for “its platform to design, construct and assemble large strings
of oligonucleotides.”
Ken Howard Wilan, Commercializing Synthetic Biology,
BIOENTREPRENEUR (2005) (reporting that Jay Keasling, UC-Berkeley Professor of
Bioengineering and Chemical Engineering, formed two synthetic biology start-ups—not only
Codon Devices, but also Amyris Biotechnologies—the latter receiving $12.5 million from
OneWorldHealth, a non-profit pharmaceutical company in San Francisco). Second, in RNAi,
Merck became the exclusive licensee of Sirna’s broad RNAi patents through its purchase of
Sirna. See Schmidt, supra note 61, at 273. Third, in nanotechnology, Harvard exclusively
licensed chemist George Whitesides’ patents to Nano-Terra. Thayer, Harvard Licenses
Nanotech Patents, supra note 85. For an economic take on this trend, see SCOTCHMER, supra
note 87, at 236.
An exclusive license insulates the licensee from competition, and the resulting
monopoly profit can be shared with the university through the fees. Nonexclusive
licenses are usually reserved for situations where the university perceives it has no
other choice—for example, where [additional] industrial users threaten to challenge
or design around the university’s patents. . . . [Seventy-four] percent of university
licensing offices “almost always” grant sponsors the right to negotiate exclusive
licenses.
Yet Scotchmer also asserts in a footnote on the same page that this “distinction between
exclusive and nonexclusive licensing is a bit artificial, since the profit advantage of exclusive
licens[es] can often be achieved with nonexclusive licenses and high royalties.” Id. at 236 n.7.
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initial public offering or as an acquisition.
NB/BN has experienced
much growth, but continued rapid development is threatened by patent
thickets that either already exist or are looming throughout
nanotechnology, though particularly in NB/BN. Combine the thicket
problem with the high concentration of venture capital within
218
nanotechnology, and one may expect a high rate of failure among
NB/BN start-ups as well. However, a high failure rate does not mean
that those few that eventually exit successfully will not succeed very
well. Given the enormous potential in all three technologies, the most
promising companies will be acquired for lucrative sums. Being one of
the successful few will still be extremely difficult. A strong patent
portfolio that indicates to venture capitalists that a company is relatively
low risk for an unsuccessful exit within seven years may often be a
219
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for success.
The greatest financing challenge for NB/BN, synthetic biology, and
RNAi may be in medical applications outside of a highly promising drug
delivery patent, because of the caution shown by biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies, as well as much uncertainty in FDA
220
regulatory approval and clinical utilization. Nonetheless, despite their
cautious approach to acquisitions, established biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies increasingly engaged in them from 1998 to
221
2006.
These companies have pursued the safest route with these

217. Thus, as critically important as venture capital is as a step towards a successful
exit, it is only that; there is no guarantee that one will make the exit. Cf. GARY P. PISANO,
SCIENCE BUSINESS: THE PROMISE, THE REALITY AND THE FUTURE OF BIOTECH 162
(2006) (drawing an analogy between raising capital in biotech and getting an official number
for the Boston Marathon; it can be tough to qualify, but tougher still to do well in the race).
218. Ann M. Thayer, Nanotech Investing, 83 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS, May 2,
2005, at 1 (reporting that 10% of the more than 1,200 nanotechnology-related start-ups
worldwide have received venture capital, “and just 10% of those have received more than
one round of funding”; thus, if this report is accurate, just [twelve] of these start-ups have
received two or more rounds of venture capital funding).
219. Cf. ULDRICH, supra note 199, at 246.
[M]ost investors have limited patience. Many of the [nanotechnology] companies
listed in this book are the recipients of venture capital. Venture capitalists are
typically willing to give a company anywhere between three and seven years to
prove they can either be a viable acquisition target or succeed on the public market.
If companies cannot demonstrate progress toward these established goals, funding is
going to become increasingly difficult to obtain.
220. Regarding the uncertain but possibly very large health (as well as environmental)
risks of nanomaterials, see generally Lin, supra note 195.
221. Cf. Nixon Peabody LLP, Nixon Peabody LLP Attorneys Speak at BIO
International
Convention,
May
3,
2007,
http://www.sixbey.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=1817 [hereinafter AGE OF ACQUISITION]
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highly promising, yet also highly uncertain, technologies. Instead of
doing the R&D themselves, they have entered into licensing
agreements, relying on government and academic research, and waiting
222
until the regulatory climate becomes clearer.
Because many drug
223
patents are set to expire soon, drug development—despite all of the
potential R&D hurdles—is one of the relatively safer bets in all three
technologies for government, university, and start-up investment. An
increasing percentage of total venture capital is given to life sciences
224
companies.
This trend most likely reflects not only the near-term
expiration of many drug-related patents in these technologies which
fuels drug development, but also the lack of direct investment from
major pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that prefer instead
to rely on government-or-university-to-start-up de facto research
pipelines.
Nonetheless, probably the most commercially promising exclusive
licensing deal of 2007—Harvard’s licensing of George Whitesides’
nanotechnology patents to Nano-Terra—will apparently require no
225
venture capital. Nano-Terra and Harvard will co-own the technology,
which is already licensed to several large established private companies,
226
as well as the Department of Defense.
This may be because
Whitesides previously helped create three biotechnology companies
227
with “a combined market value of nearly $20 billion” and is also a
228
highly esteemed expert in nanotechnology. Without a combination of
proven business acumen and scientific expertise, researchers in
government agencies, universities, and start-ups should not count on
being able to bypass venture capital like Harvard and Nano-Terra
(reporting that firm attorney Philip Taub would be moderating a conference panel “The Age
of Acquisition: Business Strategies for Biotech Companies.”) (emphasis added).
222. Cf. Morrow, Gauging Nanobiotech’s Promise, supra note 190.
223. See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 154.
224. LUX NANOTECH INDEX, supra note 24 (reporting that venture capital investment
in the life sciences increased from 13% to 28% of total venture capital investment).
225. Having licensed more than fifty patents from Harvard, “Nano-Terra has not
raised venture capital; instead, its founders and employees, along with advisors and Harvard
University, own the company.” Jeffrey Carbeck, Nano-Terra, Inc., Nano-Terra, A Scientist’s
Approach to Commercializing Science, Presentation at the AIChE 2007 Annual Meeting
(Nov.
7,
2007)
(abstract
available
at
http://aiche.confex.com/aiche/2007/preliminaryprogram/abstract_100463.htm).
226. Thayer, Harvard Licenses Nanotech Patents, supra note 85.
227. Id.
228. Barnaby J. Feder, Harvard is Licensing More Than 50 Patents to a
TIMES,
June
4,
2007,
available
at
Nanotechnology
Start-Up,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/technology/04nano.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
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apparently will be able to do. Moreover, much uncertainty persists with
even the most commercially promising start-ups such as Nano-Terra, as
seen by the disappointments of some other seemingly very promising
229
similar start-ups.
F. Through the Minds of Prospective Buyers: How Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Companies Acquire NB/BN, Synthetic Biology, and
RNAi Technology
Merger and acquisition activity—especially acquisition activity—has
increased sharply in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
over the last few years, leading some industry analysts to refer to these
230
times in the life science industry as an “age of acquisition.” Although
making a patent portfolio an attractive acquisition target may appear to
231
be elusive because of many firm-specific factors, the generalization
that companies can be expected to be risk-averse, with calculated and
232
cautious purchases built on solid patent portfolios, nonetheless holds.
A corollary to the risk-averse nature of these companies is that they
would like to increase the acquisition risks that face their competitors,
which they can do by dominating a nascent market, as long as the
barriers to entry that such increased risks create do not run afoul of
233
antitrust law.

229. See, e.g., Thayer, Harvard Licenses Nanotech Patents, supra note 85.
230. See AGE OF ACQUISITION, supra note 221.
231. See James Mittra, Life Science Innovation and the Restructuring of the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Merger, Acquisition and Strategic Alliance Behaviour of Large
Firms, 19 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 279, 279 (2007) (reporting that the present
preferred balance in the pharmaceutical industry between in-house R&D and externally
sourced knowledge is due to numerous very firm-specific factors).
232. Regarding nanomedicine, compare Kostas Kostarelos, Editorial, Establishing
Nanomedicine, 1 NANOMEDICINE 259, 260 (2006), reporting that although quite a few big
pharmaceutical companies like the ideas and technologies in nanomedicine, because they
consider most nanomedicine companies early stage and high risk, these pharmaceutical
companies are fitting nanomedicinal technologies into their pre-established markets.
233. Cf., Mark Hollmer, News In-Brief: Merck Establishes a Foothold in RNAi, 25
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 9, 9 (2007). Although Hollmer does not specifically address
antitrust issues, he does discuss Merck’s exclusive licensing of a broad RNAi patent portfolio
that may help the large pharmaceutical company dominate the nascent industry by excluding
competitors from a large percentage of the new technological turf. If the percentage of turf
excluded gets too high, it is possible that Merck could obtain a monopoly. Excessive anticompetitive effects of broad patent portfolios could thus create antitrust problems.
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IV. OVERCOMING NEAR-TERM OVER-OPTIMISM TO REALIZE LONGTERM REVOLUTIONARY GAINS: A SOBERING LOOK AT THE MODEST
MEDICAL GAINS IN FIGHTING AMERICA’S TOP THREE KILLERS—
234
HEART DISEASE, CANCER, AND CEREBROVASCULAR DISEASE
Emphasis on the great medical potential of NB/BN, synthetic
biology, and RNAi threads its way through NNI, NIH, and other U.S.
235
government institute reports,
academic projections of medical
applications, and emerging growth company and venture capitalist hype.
Although this potential is indeed great, it will not be realized anytime
soon. Do not expect radical reductions in the incidence, prevalence, and
mortality rates for the three most common causes of death in the United
States—heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease—anytime in
the next twenty years. NB/BN, synthetic biology, RNAi, and other new
biotechnologies all promise great breakthroughs in our fights against
these and other chronic diseases. Realizing this promise, however, will
most likely require major advances in not just the technologies, but also,
inter alia, better comprehension of complicated multilayered cellular,
molecular, extracellular, and system-wide (e.g., genome-level,
proteome-level) human biology. Thus, it is highly unlikely that any of
the three technologies will realize this great promise in the next twenty
years. Moreover, there is no guarantee that anticipated and/or
unforeseen barriers to safe and efficacious medical intervention will not
contraindicate the use of all of these technologies even in the remote
future. We must proceed with equal parts vigorous enthusiasm and
rigorous skeptical inquiry into what could go wrong. Presently,
optimism is not sufficiently tempered by skepticism and rigorous
searches for obstacles to implementation and ways to overcome these
obstacles.
What have we seen in the last forty years? In the 1960s, we heard
that a “cure for cancer” was imminent, but, despite huge funding, there
is still no cure, although ironically, unjustified hype appears to continue

234. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 109 fig.20 (2007) (displaying tabular data
that show heart disease, cancer, and stroke to be the first, second, and third most common
causes of death, respectively, in the United States for every decade from 1950 through 1980,
every five years from 1985 through 1995, and every year from 1996 through 2004).
235. The FDA being a notable and predictable exception. See, for example, the
FDA’s guardedly optimistic language regarding the uses of nanotechnology. See FDA
Statement on Whether There are Regulated Nanotech Products, supra note 32. Canada may
be a bit different. See ONTARIO MEDICAL NANOTECH HORIZON, supra note 37, at 12.
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unabated.
In the 1980s, the biotechnology hype also promised
monumental changes in treatment for various genetic disorders. In the
1990s, gene cloning identified all sorts of targets for intervention with
many deadly chronic diseases, but again the deadliest three—heart
disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease—remained major lethal
threats. We did not fully anticipate the obstacles to interventions such
as gene therapy. Although there are reports that “[n]anotechnology has
been increasingly utilized to enhance bone tissue engineering
237
strategies,” tissue engineering, though very promising, has not yet
been used extensively in medicine. Unfortunately, when trying to
develop and market complicated new technology—or when trying to
236. See George L. Gabor Miklos & Phillip J. Baird, The Latest Surge in the War on
Cancer; Tour de Force or Tour de Farce?, posted by Otis to You Bet Your Life,
http://barnesworld.blogs.com/barnes_world/2007/03/george_l_gabor_.html (March 05, 2007,
3:00 EST) (arguing that The Cancer Genome Alliance (TCGA) is making completely
unwarranted promises of potential applications of the data to personalized medicine, with a
representative of the National Cancer Institute even promising that all suffering and death
from cancer will be eliminated by 2015). Miklos and Baird argue that the data TCGA is
collecting appears irrelevant to the individualized clinical genetics of cancer where the key
outstanding question is “[h]ow do we sort the mutations of very different types which may
produce a clinical outcome in the unique genetic and epigenetic background of that particular
individual[?]” Id. The authors contend that the effectiveness of drug treatment for individual
cancers is determined by a genomically heterogeneous cell population consisting of
imbalanced genomes at both the genetic and epigenetic levels, necessitating better systemslevel understanding of the differences to predict therapeutically relevant outcomes. Id. This
implies that the billions of dollars of public money that will be invested in single gene pair
mutations, without genome-level multivariate systemic analysis, may be tragically wasted.
They see TCGA as built on the false premise that the mutational signature of the bulk tumor
is congruent to that of its metastatic derivatives and thus offers illusory hope of a
personalized therapeutic application built on bulk tumor, rather than stem cell population,
information. The stem cell population information, the authors contend, would “still offer
some hope.” Id. However, Miklos and Baird’s criticism appears excessively harsh and not
entirely valid, given that other researchers believe that TCGA is providing us with
remarkably valuable information. See, e.g., W.C. Cho, Review, A Future of Cancer
Prevention and Cures: Highlights of the Centennial Meeting of the American Association for
Cancer Research, 19 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 205, 205 (2008). The complexity of
carcinogenesis is reflected in ongoing debates regarding the roles that mutations might play in
cancer and thus the potential of targeting mutations in oncotherapy. Compare Lawrence A.
Loeb et al., Point-Counterpoint Review, Cancers Exhibit a Mutator Phenotype: Clinical
Implications, 68 CANCER RES. 3551, 3551 (2008) (arguing that cancer cells have a mutation
rate that exceeds that of normal cells and thus inhibiting mutator pathways could prevent
cancer) with I. Walter Bodmer, Response, Cancers Exhibit a Mutator Phenotype: Clinical
Implications, 68 CANCER RES. 3551, 3557 (2008) (criticizing this mutator phenotype
hypothesis because natural selection would confer no advantage to Loeb et al.’s “unexpanded
random mutations,” and therefore, they will rarely occur in the tumor and are “irrelevant for
the overall biology of the tumor”).
237. Kyobum Kim & John P. Fisher, Nanoparticle Technology in Bone Tissue
Engineering, 15 J. DRUG TARGETING 241, 241 (2007).
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secure funding from Congress—there can be much pressure to look
rigorously for how things could work to satisfy potentially wary funding
sources, but there is often less pressure to examine rigorously all that
could go wrong.
Some of what will go wrong will only be discovered via
experimentation, but some of it can be anticipated. If we are truly more
interested in long-term medical gains than short-term financial gains, we
must be hyper-vigilant about investigating obstacles to major
developments and how we could best overcome or circumvent them.
Unfortunately, this is outside the tactical and strategic thinking that
frames the work of most commercial researchers, executives, and
investors. As I will argue in Part V.B.2, this requires an idealistic public
commitment to long-term sophisticated research.
Also recall the many surprising findings pertinent to regulation of
protein expression, reported by ENCODE and others, described in Part
I.B.2, which implicate both mechanistic biology and systems biology.
NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi will thus need to coordinate their
technologies with forthcoming basic research that elucidates the
implications of the surprising new findings to realize revolutionary
238
clinical gains in heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease.
Intracellular mechanisms are sources of much of the planned targeted
239
clinical intervention in all three technologies discussed in this Article.
Accurate higher-level systemic analysis is also essential for pertinent
240
Sorting out the many
clinical developments in synthetic biology.
diverse and intertwined cellular and extracellular surprising new
findings pertinent to normal and pathological human conditions will of
course take much time.
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: FURTHER WEED OUT THE PATENT
THICKETS, INCREASE PATENT QUALITY, AND SHIFT THE MAIN FOCUS
FROM MAXIMIZING NEAR-TERM COMMERCIALIZATION TO
MAXIMIZING LONG-TERM MEDICAL PROGRESS
Heraclitus made two pertinent prophetic points 2500 years ago: “[a]
thing’s (the world’s) real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself”

238. Regarding cancer, see, for example, Pagano et al., supra note 66, at 0181–82
(finding down-regulation of 21A endogenous ncRNA in tumor cell lines and concluding that
the role that this newly discovered transcript plays in tumor cell proliferation needs further
investigation).
239. See supra Part I.B.2.
240. See supra Part I.B.2.
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and “lovers of wisdom ought very much to be enquirers into many
241
ENCODE et al.’s new picture of mammalian regulation of
things.”
protein expression is contrary to many decades-old assumptions. This is
a picture of nucleic acid and amino acid sequences involved in
extraordinarily complex multilayered regulatory phenotypic controls
from the level of the small sequence all the way up to the genome and
242
proteome.
Considering this complexity—and considering too that
gene therapy has yet even to approximate the ground-breaking clinical
243
success it was promised to be —one must approach the great medical
promises of these nascent technologies with a healthy dose of
skepticism.
This pithy 1808 rhyme from Walter Scott’s poem Marmion is also
prophetic: “Oh! what a tangled web we weave [w]hen we first practi[c]e
244
to deceive!”
This prophecy applies doubly. One tangled web is a
245
This
huge, broad, and often-overlapping group of patent portfolios.
web ostensibly protects innovations derived from an even more tangled
web of overlapping mammalian biophysics, bioengineering,
biochemistry, and cell and molecular biology which apples to NB/BN,
246
synthetic biology, and RNAi.
The following is clear in these three
nascent technologies: to varying degrees, all have thickets, invalid
patents of indefinite claim scope (with related inadequacies in the
written descriptions), and potentially infringing patents of broad claim
247
scope.
These thickets, invalid patents, and potentially infringing
patents threaten to stymie commercial development via massive
248
litigation.
If the patent portfolio is critical to the commercial development of

241. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS: A TEXT AND TRANSLATION, 29, 71 (T.M. Robinson
trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1987).
242. See supra Part I.B.
243. Not only has it not been a ground-breaking clinical success, gene therapy has had
at least one very high-profile lethal failure. See Couzin & Kaiser, infra note 289.
244. WALTER SCOTT, MARMION 205 (William J. Rolfe ed., The Riverside Press 1913)
(1808).
245. See supra Part II.B.
246. See supra Part I.B.
247. See supra Part II.B.
248. Cf. Giovanni Dosi et al., Knowledge, Competition and Innovation: Is Strong IPR
Protection Really Needed for More and Better Innovations?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 471, 477 (2007) (contending that the literature on cumulative, sequential, and
complementary technological progress indicates that if technological opportunities for firms
are not mutually independent, patents can cause holdup phenomena, such as patent thickets
and anticommons and, in the long-term, deter innovation).
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NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, an important policy question is
whether it should have such critical importance. Important related
questions are whether patent portfolios, considered both within each
technology and across two or more of the technologies, are likely to
hinder or facilitate the best types of growth in the technologies. In this
part of the Article, I argue that the quality of patent portfolios can be
improved—and the risk of patent thickets and low quality patents
stymieing commercialization consequently reduced—via various
reforms in patent law and patent examination procedure and review.
However, I also argue that these reforms will not suffice to facilitate
near-optimal medical progress for two main reasons. First, upstream
building blocks and other basic foundations, such as research tools, need
to be broadly accessible via scientific and technological commons.
Second, the most promising research is also very risky, expensive, and
long-term, which makes it unsuitable for collaborative government
agency or university-start-up-big pharma/biotech developmental
pipelines and the securing of a reliable finance source. This latter fact is
largely due to the daunting interconnected complexity of cellular,
extracellular, and metabolic mechanisms, higher-level biological
systems, and clinical medical translational problems. These problems
include barriers to creating fairly precise links between basic laboratory
science, animal experimentation, and clinical trials with humans.
Nonetheless, such fairly precise translations will be needed for the most
ambitious innovations that will make leaps, rather than incremental
steps, toward revolutionary advances in medical diagnostics, prevention,
and treatment.
This is how we might further untangle the patent web and increase
patent quality. Although not in itself a panacea, the untangling will at
least afford us more valid, secure, and non-infringing patent portfolios.
Three related statements from Albert Einstein—”[o]ut of clutter, find
simplicity”; “[f]rom discord, find harmony”; and “[i]n the middle of
250
difficulty lies opportunity” —apply as well. Findings from ENCODE
et al. strongly imply that intracellular and extracellular regulations of
phenotype production are linked via extraordinarily intricate, variable,
251
and multilayered connections. The technological boundaries between
BN and NB, as well as between NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi

249. See infra Part II.A.
250. ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 322 (Alice Calaprice
ed., 2000).
251. See supra Part I.B.

REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED

3/16/2009 9:52 AM

2009]NANOBIOTECHNOLOGY, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, AND RNAI 191

are also blurred because of complexities and uncertainties, in addition
252
The patent portfolio in itself is not
to categorical overlap.
problematic, so much as the ease of getting patents and building a
commercially valuable portfolio that may nonetheless contain invalid or
infringing patents. The low value of most individual patents vis-à-vis
patent portfolios is a large part of the problem, and the market alone is
253
unlikely to create the necessary incentives to fix it. Nonetheless, one
must also be wary of the formation of commons for reasons that
ostensibly promote the public good, but are in actuality a close cousin of
“regulatory capture,” that is, a way for people who already possess
254
patents to reduce the patenting potential of future competitors.
A much more finely tuned balance between private patent
protection and public incentives for inventions could facilitate truly
major medical progress in the next twenty years. Private patent
255
protection must be guided by additional changes in patent law.
Commons are necessary for upstream building blocks to secure the
256
foundation of valid and reliable basic science and technology.
Governmentally and philanthropically funded prizes for cures or
preventions for diseases would be salutary supplements to particular
reforms in patent law and examination procedure and the proper
257
creation and maintenance of parallel commons. There is no panacea

252. See supra Part I.A.
253. Compare Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 60 (“Perhaps the most
important prediction enabled by the portfolio theory is that the current patent intensity
(patents obtained per research dollar) should not be expected to drop dramatically—at least
absent the intervention of other major factors, such as substantive legal changes.”) with
Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 83, at 82 (reporting that voluntary
arrangements can occur between established incumbents with a shared incentive to clear out
a patent thicket by signing broad cross-licenses). In nascent fields like the three discussed in
this Article where new start-ups own much of the patents, however, there are no established
incumbents.
254. Cf. Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1747 (reporting, in the context of synthetic
biology, “the attempt by individuals to use intellectual property rights to create a ‘commons,’
just as [the] developers of free and open-source software use the leverage of software
copyrights to impose requirements of openness on future programmers—requirements
greater than those attaching to a public domain work”).
255. See infra Part V.A.1.
256. See infra Part V.B.1.
257. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Editorial, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A
Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRITISH MED. J.
1279, 1279–80 (2006) (recommending government-funded prizes for cures to diseases—such
as malaria—that primarily affect third world countries because there are insufficient
incentives for the commercial development of cures for these diseases). See also
SCOTCHMER, supra note 87, at 39, 41–42 (providing an economic analysis of two types of
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for either the somewhat chaotic patent portfolio landscape or longfunded but still refractory killers such as our country’s most common:
heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease. Nonetheless, there is
much more that we can and should do.
A. Further Weed Out the Patent Thickets and Increase Patent Quality:
Why KSR and the Patent Reform Act Probably Will Not Suffice and
How We Could Do More
1. Additional Changes Recommended: Prosecution History Estoppel,
258
Improved Injunctive Relief to Deter Holdups from Trolls, and
Removal of the Prior Art Limit to Reexaminations
The Supreme Court and Congress are both to be lauded for
initiating reforms that should help weed out overbroad and potentially
overlapping patents from thickets and thickets-in-the-making in all
three technologies. But considering the expense and the retardation of
development that thickets effect, the federal courts and Congress should
go farther. IP scholars have recommended several promising ex ante
and ex post legal changes that deserve greater consideration from judges
and legislators. Prosecution history estoppel, which could force patent
applicants to produce sufficient information about their patented
invention at an early stage, is a promising ex ante recommended
259
change. Removing the prior art limit to reexaminations (the removal
being somewhat like extending to reexaminations KSR’s prescription
that obviousness inquiries be expansive and thus may need to consider
more than just the prior art) and providing injunctive relief to reduce
260
patent trolls are both very promising ex post recommended changes.
prizes as alternatives to patents—”targeted prizes,” which are directed ex ante at well-known
needs that originate with sponsors, and “blue sky prizes,” which are directed ex post at the
value of the innovation—and arguing that “[t]he advantage of prizes over patents is that they
can avoid the deadweight loss of proprietary pricing”).
258. Although injunctive relief proposals have been very seriously considered, it now
appears unlikely that injunctive relief will be a major component of the Patent Reform Act
that eventually passes to become law. See H.R. 1908; S. 1145; S. 3600.
259. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 10, 69–71.
260. See Mark A. Lemley, Patent Reform Legislation—Public Comments on Substitute
HR 2795 and the Role of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Testimony Before the
Antitrust
Modernization
Commission
7–9
(Oct.
24,
2005),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/statement_Lemley.pdf. But cf.
id. at 1–2 (arguing that while abusive patent litigation is reported by innovators in
semiconductor, computer, Internet, and telecommunications, it is not a problem for the
medical device, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical industries because of differences in the
two types of industries). Lemley states, “pharmaceutical patents are more likely to cover a
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2. Impractical Given the Extraordinary Cross-Industry Nature of the
Technologies: Extensive Industry-Specific Patent System Reform
Some scholars have noted that patent problems are often industryspecific, with divergence most common between biotechnology and
pharmaceutical patents and software patents, leading some to question
261
whether the patent system should be tailored to such differences.
Category-specific patent rules may be both feasible and desirable for
some types of patents, such as business methods patents and software
262
patents.
However, even if nanotechnology is limited as it has been
here to NB/BN, because NB/BN often incorporates computer science
and other fields, it would oversimplify this interdisciplinary technology
263
to place it in a single natural science category.
Similarly, synthetic
biology involves code-driven information, which makes it, somewhat
264
like bioinformatics, an awkward exclusive fit in biotechnology. Only
RNAi could possibly be placed exclusively in a biotechnology category,
but because of potential salutary synergies between RNAi and both

whole drug, rather than one of 5,000 different components of a semiconductor chip.” Id.
This perception may indeed be common and thus explain why many in the computer industry
have supported the most recent patent reform proposals, while many in the life sciences
industry have not. See also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent
Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L. J. 689, 693
(2006) (“Large biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies (biotech/pharma) do
not face the same threat that their info-tech counterparts face. This lack of cohesiveness has
likely delayed or prevented the passage of some of the proposed patent reforms.”). However,
nascent multidisciplinary technologies such as the three discussed here—especially synthetic
biology—straddle the computer/life sciences dichotomy. Cf. Arti Rai & James Boyle,
Synthetic Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5
PLOS BIOLOGY 0389, 0389-90 (2007) (“Intellectual property law in the U[.]S[.] has already
had difficulty incorporating the revolutionary technologies from which synthetic biology
draws inspiration—biotechnology and computers.”). Given the multitude and diversity of
patents, as well as patent thickets, in these three nascent technologies, it is very possible that,
by the time many of the innovations covered by patents in the technologies become
commercially viable, injunctive threats from trolls could be problematic for these patents too.
261. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 214, at 496–501 (noting many distinctions between
these two broad categories of patents).
262. See id. (arguing that software and business methods patents both pose particular
problems that warrant specific reforms tailored to these categories).
263. See Rai & Boyle, supra note 260. See also supra text accompanying note 259.
Regarding NB/BN, compare NCI Alliance for Nanotechnology in Cancer, Nat’l Cancer Inst.,
Where Science and Law Meet, MONTHLY FEATURE, Oct. 2006, at 2, available at
http://nano.cancer.gov/news_center/monthly_feature_2006_oct.asp, and the statement “the
filing of a nanotechnology patent often involves a team of scientists representing many
scientific disciplines collaborating on a technology comprising multiple components, each of
which might require multiple IP licenses.”
264. Cf. Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0391.
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NB/BN and synthetic biology, even RNAi does not support the
266
argument for category-specific reform. Category-specific reform could
also add a burdensome bureaucratic layer to pertinent patent analysis.
B. Parallel Science and Technology Commons
1. Commons for Pertinent Upstream Basic Science and Technology:
Which Commons Type for Valid and Reliable Building Block Standards
in the Three Nascent Technologies?
Broad foundational patents have been reported to slow growth in
267
many industries.
Research at ENCODE and elsewhere reveals the
need for a more accurate and deeper understanding of human biology.
This understanding is one of the most important foundational
268
knowledge bases in all three nascent technologies.
In synthetic
biology, unlike in NB/BN, many of the building blocks have been kept
269
in commons.
However, although building parallel commons could
provide an effective thicket prophylactic, the commons in synthetic
270
The
biology in themselves have thus far not deterred thickets.
absence of successful patent pools in the life sciences is also cause for
271
concern.
One promising solution is to obtain statements of non-assertion from
other patentees in patent-based commons such as the Registry of
Standardized Biological Parts at MIT, especially considering that many
of the innovations in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi will be made
272
in academia and government. Another good idea is for MIT to “open
the Registry to any owner that promised to donate its parts to the public
265. See supra note 29.
266. Moreover, even where Menell seeks categorical reform—software and business
patents—he states that the boundaries of these patents are inherently ambiguous. Menell,
supra note 214, at 506. Although he implies that this ambiguity is primarily a reflection of
claim indefiniteness created by inadequate prosecution, see id., there are also disciplinary
boundary problems in software or business methods made to achieve biotechnology goals.
267. See, e.g., Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0390 (arguing that considerable evidence
from virtually every important industry in the twentieth century reveals that broad patents on
foundational research can retard industry growth).
268. See supra Part I.B.
269. See Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0391.
270. Cf. Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1768 (“Even in its nascent state, the synthetic
biology research space is filled with proprietary rights.”).
271. See id.
272. Cf. Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0391 (stating that because many of the MIT
registry patents are owned by academia and government, statements of non-assertion in the
registry would be “a salutary development and a comfort to those working on the registry”).
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domain after some fixed number of years.”
The synthetic biology
commons should be extended to interfaces between synthetic biology
and other technologies, especially NB/BN and RNAi (as well as
274
correlational research linking genotypes to phenotypes ). Because of
the cross-disciplinary nature of these technologies, many of the grants
that fuel the research that feeds the commons should likewise be cross275
disciplinary.
However, the highly contentious disputes over the
degree to which foundational genomic information should be preserved
in a scientific commons suggest that attempts to expand or add
foundational commons pertinent to the three nascent technologies
276
discussed here would meet stiff resistance.

273. Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, News and Views, The Economics of
Synthetic Biology, 3:117 MOLECULAR SYS. BIOLOGY 1, 4 (2007) (acknowledging that this
prescription assumes that the MIT Registry will remain “the world’s premier focal point for
recording and sharing parts information”). The authors nonetheless argue that this is a safe
assumption for two reasons. First, “scientific databases . . . almost always follow a winnertake-all dynamic in which frontrunners become larger and more entrenched over time.”
Second, the risk of would-be monopolists trying to build their own proprietary databases to
challenge the Registry is manageable because “[f]or every company that wanted to
monopolize parts data, there would be several others trying to block it. The Registry would
almost certainly receive their support.” Id.
274. Cf. Klein, Gene Patents, supra note 166 (stating that “it is in the public interest
that our courts do not expand patent-eligible subject matter to include ownership of
medically related genotype-phenotype correlations”).
275. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 188–89.
There is deep knowledge within specific disciplines (e.g., chemistry, genomics), but
less knowledge that helps us understand connections across disciplines. . . . Part of
the problem may . . . be due to the grants funding process, which tends to reward
investigators for narrow, well-defined research projects. . . . The current peer review
process for grants . . . can . . . create barriers to cross-disciplinary work. . . . Critics of
the grants process point to the “war on cancer” as an example of how funding can
divert researchers from the most important problems. According to one account,
while metastatic processes lead to about [ninety] percent of all cancer deaths, less
than 0.5 percent of National Cancer Institute study proposals made between 1972
and 2004 focused primarily on metastasis.
Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What We Know Now, 24
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320, 321 (2006) (arguing that because NIH’s promotion of its
guidelines to license nonexclusively and make widely available upstream research tools
primarily used for discovery rather than products in themselves has fostered access to
upstream technologies, this promotion should serve as a model for other federal agencies to
emulate).
276. Different perceptions on the critical need to preserve the scientific commons in
genomics for, inter alia, the creation of standard building blocks perhaps explains reports of
“vigorous, sometimes even vicious, fight[s]” where public investment has been both high and
high-profile (e.g., Human Genome Project). Robert Cook-Deegan, The Science Commons in
Health Research: Structure, Function, and Value, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 133, 136 (2007),
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/782310p623282449/fulltext.pdf.
In
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To counter this resistance, it is important to emphasize that the
commons would not replace, but rather complement, commercial
development via synergistic feeding of increasingly accurate basic
277
science and technology.
Moreover, universities may not need the
patenting and licensing revenue that results from placing a
disproportionate emphasis on such commercial development. Even if
university patenting and licensing suffer because some researchers move
away from near-term commercializable research, universities will not

examining the competition between public and private gene data provision, Cook-Deegan
himself forcefully argues that the latter option has been highly problematic for basic research
because of constraints on private gene sequences which effectively delayed access to the
sequences until after patents issued or companies published the sequencing information.
Cook-Deegan reports that these revelations via patenting or publication happened only if it
was in the companies’ commercial interests. Id. at 142. See also Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting
Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 284 (2005) (arguing that while limited access to
upstream molecular biology research tools could stifle innovation, weakening patent rights
could also reduce the rate of innovation, thus implying a suboptimal innovation tradeoff,
although she offers a way around the tradeoff for NIH-funded upstream tools: licenses of
right provisions in grant funding). In nanotechnology, Ted Sabety contends that governmentfunding agencies should position seminal upstream foundational patents. See Sabety, supra
note 101, at 279.
277. See Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory
Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 136–37 (2007) (stating that the
power of innovation and market-stimulated research is widely viewed as stemming from a
strong open basic science base). Cf. Misha Angrist & Robert M. Cook- Deegan, Who Owns
NEW
ATLANTIS
87,
96
(2006),
available
at
the
Genome?,
11
THE
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA11-AngristCook-Deegan.pdf.
[I]t is also possible that the gathering enthusiasm for “open and collaborative”
research, even in the private sector, signals an inflection point. Perhaps we have
moved beyond the impassioned rhetoric of public versus private; perhaps we no
longer regard the human genome as either “the common heritage of all mankind”
immune from IP rights or as a Wild West for speculative patents and endless court
fights.
The ultimate fate of genomic research—who (if anyone) owns, pays for, and
innovates with genomic information—won’t be known for decades. But we are
increasingly moving beyond the two-dimensional modes of thinking that
characterized the early days of biotechnology. Legions of genome scientists (Craig
Venter among them) now promote patenting and commercialization in some areas,
such as protein-based drugs, while simultaneously promoting open science and
expressing hostility to restrictive patents in others, such as software and raw data.
Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 188 (arguing that basic R&D can reduce risk for downstream
commercialization by generating knowledge that reduces uncertainty and, thus, “[a]ny
strategies or policies at the university level (such as exclusive licensing) that discourage or
inhibit the broad flow of basic scientific information are clearly problematic”). Recall from
Part IV.D, supra, that exclusive licensing appears to be a likely stop on the route to
commercialization for many developments in the three nascent technologies.
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suffer too much financially because they have many other ways to
278
market their knowledge.
2. Which Commons Type for Very High Risk and Very Long-Term
Technological Developments That Could Truly Revolutionize
Medicine?
Unclear or excessive patent claim scope is in part due to the ease of
obtaining patents of dubious value such that many companies can tout
huge and varied patent portfolios without attending to individual
279
patents or claims except those of exceptional worth. Massive litigation
effecting patent deadlock may well be prevented by the collective
efforts of government agencies, universities, start-ups, venture
capitalists, and established pharmaceutical and biotechnological firms,
as well as the PTO, Congress, and the federal courts. But even if this
should occur, patent portfolio-enabled commercialization will not lead
to huge medical advances, because none of the researchers, developers,
and enablers of commercialization has sufficient incentive to produce
the resources needed for long-term investments where the payoff is
280
highly uncertain but potentially huge.
The infeasibility of creating a viable commercial development plan
for the most promising long-term medical gains that could well be
enabled by much more advanced forms of these technologies makes the
near-term university-start-up-venture capital-acquisition commercial
R&D pipeline appear inadequate. There is talk of creating longer-term
commercial partnerships, but with no probable revolutionary output for
at least twenty years, incentives to sever such partnerships on truly
revolutionary projects will be hard to counter. Venture capitalist

278. See Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations: A Better Way
8-9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 407, 2007), available at
http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf (arguing that universities transfer information,
materials, equipment, instruments, human capital, networks, and prototypes a variety of
ways, patenting and licensing being just one and not necessarily the most economically
valuable way).
279. See supra Part II.B.
280. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 190.
[T]he [IP] monetization mind-set [in universities] . . . increasingly influences
licensing and disclosure policies . . . that may inhibit the broad flow of critical
scientific information. These policies are aimed at maximizing university licensing
revenues and equity returns rather than maximizing the contribution to the scientific
commons. A shift in mentality and policies is needed. Over the long term, the
continued scientific advance of biotechnology and improving the prospects for
commercially successful R&D requires greater emphasis on the scientific commons.
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demand for a commercial success within seven years will create path
dependencies, and associated path dependency-created science and
technology capacity limits will foster modest fixes to the large and
281
diverse range of technological problems. There is also talk of strong
companies—perhaps Nano-Terra being a good prototype, given its
apparent lack of a need for venture capital and its co-ownership of IP
with Harvard—making revolutionary breakthroughs via an
accumulation of incremental advances, each building on previous
successes. But even the most well-financed and prestigious near-term
commercial alliances, such as Harvard-Nano-Terra, will create
restrictive path dependencies based on the research investments needed
for successful commercialization. Because the best medical gains from
all the technologies will require basic and translational research on
scientific and technological paths too ambitious to converge with nearterm commercial paths, publicly funded collaborative commons is
282
recommended.
281. Cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 87, at 58 (Arguing that even if a better idea was
known to occur at some point in the future, in a competitive market “delay is costly[, and] if
the delay is . . . too long, then the better idea is not worth waiting for”). But venture
capitalists would have you believe otherwise. See PLATZER, supra note 150. Platzer’s
analysis, funded by the National Venture Capital Association, though it also contains
valuable and valid insights, predictably overstates the risks venture capitalists will take in
funding medical R&D: “[M]any . . . venture backed discoveries are so revolutionary that they
disrupt markets and industry segments.” Id. at 9. Truly revolutionary clinical medical
breakthroughs from any of these technologies are too uncertain and too far down the road for
a “capitalist venture.” This is implied by a recent informed commentary about business
prospects for RNAi. See, e.g., Haussecker, supra note 62, at 459.
A basic principle of economics is the inverse relationship of risk and return. The
fact that market caps of individual biotechs with little more to show than a single
approved drug may easily exceed that of all the pure-play RNAi therapeutics
companies combined, reflects the risk, but also the time involved in realizing the
therapeutic promise of RNAi.
Above all, it is the science that matters most. The delivery challenge is often cited
and despite a growing literature on delivery to the brain, bone, spleen, cancers, and
other targets, it is still uncertain which technologies will be able to combine safety
and efficacy.
This is also implied by a cautionary analogy to prospects in nanomedicine. See K. John
Morrow et al., Recent Advances in Basic and Clinical Nanomedicine, 91 MED. CLINICS N. AM.
805, 818 (2007) (citations omitted).
[M]onoclonal antibodies, one of the most significant scientific developments of the
latter twentieth century. Discovered in 1975, antibodies were widely believed to
hold great promise as cancer therapeutics, yet the early years of discovery were
marked by many failures in clinical trials. It was only after billions of dollars in
research and many frustrations that successful antibody products appeared twenty
years later.
282. Cf. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO
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Although promises of too much too soon over-hyped all of the
technologies, the problem is not so much over-hype, because all of these
technologies do indeed promise truly revolutionary clinical medical
gains as soon as twenty years from now, as it is understating the known
and unknown potential barriers to the R&D progress needed to realize
the revolutionary gains. Given the multitude and diversity of these
unknowns—and track records in both medical biotechnology and
chronic disease medicine of not fulfilling promises according to schedule
(in some cases, decades-old deadlines have passed with promised
283
medical gains still not made) —it appears likely that the best route
towards changing this state of affairs is a major, ambitious public
commitment built on these three and related technologies. We should
promise major gains in prevention and treatment for our main killers—
especially the top three: heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular
disease—in twenty years, up the funding for public research, and make
an unprecedented, unqualified demand that researchers make
demonstrable progress towards realizing the gains or else lose the public
284
funding.
Because of all of the risks associated with commercial clinical
medical development of ambitious innovations in these three
technologies, it is not surprising that venture capitalists as well as
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have shied away from
285
such innovations.
Despite the continual waves of seemingly
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:
SCIENCE, BUSINESS,
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS (2006) (“According to experts, several factors have hampered drug
development . . . [including] limitations on the scientific understanding of how to translate
research discoveries into safe and effective drugs. . . .”).
283. See supra Section I.B.
284. Cf. Litan et al., supra note 278, at 17 (“More ambitiously, agencies of the federal
government can condition their research grants on university demonstrations that they are
experimenting with and using multiple pathways to provide competition or to advance
innovations into the commercial market.”).
285. Compare PISANO, supra note 217, at 149 (Discussing biotechnology generally,
Pisano states, “[t]here are already some signs that existing mechanisms for risk management
are breaking down for the truly high-risk projects. In the post-genomics bubble period, there
was a marked change in the strategies of start-ups and the preferences of venture
capitalists.”) with Magnus Gittins, A New Model for Investors, 8 MATERIALS TODAY 54
(2005) (discussing nanotechnology, Gittins states,
[N]anotechnology is reaching a critical point in its life cycle—it must deliver on
some [of its] promises or face a crisis of confidence. . . .
....
Critical to ensuring that discoveries fulfill their potential is striking a balance where
corporations and governments can work closely with universities to drive and
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compelling promises that biotechnology start-up companies make, the
vast majority of these companies have not survived to make a successful
exit. Partly as a direct consequence, established biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies have become gun-shy about acquiring such
start-ups, and partly as an indirect consequence, start-ups appear to
286
have lost some of their entrepreneurial edge.
Proper integration of
scientific and technological knowledge in technology development is
also hampered by the diverse problem set in the pertinent science and
technology which the recent research at ENCODE et al. highlights, as
287
well as the unclear patent landscape. The need for commercial success
in the near future, combined with the complex biology underlying
conditions of health and pathology, will thus lead commercial research
designs away from ambitious, risky, long-term projects.
Extraordinarily intricate, still not well-understood, composite
intracellular/extracellular pathological conditions are implicated in
America’s three most common killers: heart disease, cancer, and
finance product development in a low-cost, low-risk way.).
286. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 184–85. Pisano notes,
the sector appears to be retreating from its position at the radical and risky end of
the R&D spectrum. It was supposed to be the entrepreneurial biotechnology firms,
unshackled from tradition and bureaucracy, that would go where big pharmaceutical
companies dared not. Unfortunately, the economics have not worked out, and
biotechnology firms [are] mov[ing] from the frontier to less risky ventures. . . . [T]his
trend should give us [some] pause. Entrepreneurial firms are expected to be at the
cutting edge of research. If young biotech firms are not pursuing the high-risk
strategies—if they are moving away from cutting-edge science—then who will focus
on the higher-risk, long-term, and less scientifically mature projects that offer
potential medical breakthroughs?
Who will be on the vanguard of the
biotechnology revolution in the future?
If “the economics have not worked out,” perhaps the entrepreneurial market is too
precarious to rely on primarily for medical breakthroughs. Perhaps we as a public ought to
demand from our federal government more prudent, well-thought-out investment in high
risk, but potentially very high medical return, long-term R&D.
287. Cf. id. at 150–52.
IP monetization and the market for know-how[ ]works very well in industries like
software and semiconductors. . . .
....
Biotechnology is quite different . . . The pieces of the drug discovery puzzle are
often not modular at all but constitute a set of independent problems. . . .
....
. . . [I]n biotechnology the IP regime is more complex and murky. It is often not
clear ex ante what is patentable and what is not. . . . Furthermore, the most valuable
IP is often not the specific molecule, but the understanding, insight, and data about
how that molecule behaves, what it can do, what its potential problems are, and how
it might be developed. This type of knowledge is often much more difficult to
patent, and yet it needs to be shared before and during the collaboration.
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cerebrovascular disease.
Although there have been many
improvements in diagnosis, prevention, and treatment for all three
diseases, we have yet to make any breakthroughs that could be causally
linked to very large reductions in incidence and prevalence rates for
these diseases. This is not for a lack of funding: Over the last forty
years, a massive amount of public money has been invested which can
be tied directly or indirectly to the prevention and treatment of these
three diseases.
Publicly funded biomedical research has consistently failed to
deliver on its greatest promises. In the 1960s, cures for all types of
cancer were promised; we are still waiting for a cure for just one type.
The laboratory researchers announce breakthrough after breakthrough,
but where is the real medical breakthrough? We expect far too little for
our health-related research money. The government granting system
has not produced a truly major breakthrough in heart disease, cancer, or
cerebrovascular disease, in part because of a lack of sufficient incentives
for the most ambitious research. But this could and should change.
Given the stakes—our lives—we need extremely prudent public
financing of these endeavors, based on thorough analyses from a large
and varied group of relatively disinterested experts.
Perhaps no one can be relied on to be absolutely disinterested in the
sense of not having career-based or other particular professional
motives that could possibly lead to the advocacy or pursuit of research
of suboptimal long-term value to the public. The basic science and
technology research culture may not have, even in the Bayh-Dole era, a
comparably strong demand for near-term commercialization which is
virtually ubiquitous in private R&D.
Nonetheless, the federal
government agency as grant-provider is itself a seller in a market niche
where political forces such as patient advocacy groups may have
particular short-term interests that are not consistent with the general
long-term public welfare. These groups often include family members
of victims of lethal diseases. Many of these family members, desperate
to hear of cures just around the corner, will be averse to skepticism.
Sympathy for their plight should not lead to a waste of billions of tax
dollars, especially when such waste will probably just perpetuate the
prevalence of many diseases for future generations.
George Miklos and Phillip Baird’s scathing criticism of apparently
grossly misfocused and overhyped research at The Cancer Genome
Atlas (TCGA), notwithstanding the probability that the criticism is only
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partly justified, underscores the point that publicly funded and
ambitious research is not all that we need. The promise from a former
National Cancer Institute Director of a cure from such research coming
by 2015 leads to serious worries that the culture of the institute may be
driven by desires to show swift progress to get coveted congressionally
earmarked funding. Part of the problem may be the careerist motives
that lead to distorted reports; when this happens in a research setting,
money can be wasted, but when it happens in an experimental clinical
289
setting, lives can be lost.
The ultimate source of this problem is us—the public—for being too
impatient, for perpetuating our ignorance as to the complexities of
human pathologies such as cancer, for demanding swift change in the
290
near-term rather than more certain change in the long-term.
Although this Article still maintains that the balance of public
commons-to-private patent-protected research is skewed somewhat
291
towards the latter, increasing the commons will only be beneficial if
288. Miklos & Baird, supra note 236.
289. Perhaps the most notorious example of distorted information reporting occurred,
according to the Justice Department, prior to the death of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger.
His death was the result of gene therapy that he received in 2000 as part of an experimental
clinical trial at the University of Pennsylvania and Children’s National Medical Center. The
Justice Department, which investigated the incident and activities that preceded it, settled the
case in 2005, reportedly alleging that human toxic reactions should have halted the trial, but
lead investigators misrepresented clinical findings to both the NIH and the FDA which
oversaw the trial. One of the investigators accused of this deception also reportedly had “a
financial interest in a company that stood to profit if the trial was successful.” Jennifer
Couzin & Jocelyn Kaiser, As Gelsinger Case Ends, Gene Therapy Suffers Another Blow, 307
SCIENCE 1028 (2005). Of course, it is easy to make too much of this high-profile tragedy, but
one must nonetheless wonder about critical conflicts of interest. Certainly, having a principal
investigator with an outside financial interest in a successful trial is something an
experimental trial for a new complicated procedure with many obstacles, both anticipated
and unanticipated, does not need. There may inevitably be incentives to downplay, if not
conceal, problems to successful implementation if one’s reputation as a scientist may be
affected by whether the trial proceeds at all and if one has cognitive biases oneself that tend
to skew risk negatively. Possible commercial conflicts of interest could easily provide
additional incentives.
290. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 8–9. Pisano argues,
In the context of biotechnology, the challenges of high risk and primary uncertainty
are further amplified by the long time horizons over which these risks and
uncertainties are resolved. . . . In science . . . the uncertainty and risks may linger for
years, sometimes decades. Cancer continues to prove a devilishly difficult disease to
understand and treat despite several decades of massive investment in basic
research. And even when one finds a “solution,” it does not necessarily have clear
implications for commercial R&D; rather, it may instead trigger a new round of
basic research.
291. Cf. Bruce H. Littman et al., What’s Next in Translational Medicine?, CLINICAL
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that commons is broadly conceived and maintained. We must always
think of the health of future generations. Their health will benefit most
from prudent investment in both rigorously defensive research—i.e., the
thorough study of all potential scientific and technological barriers to
revolutionary medical advances—and rigorously offensive research that
aims to make these advances. Patient advocacy groups may not want to
hear the sobering news that rigorously defensive research has already
provided and will continue to provide about formidable obstacles that
need to be overcome before success can be achieved, but not to pursue
such research is to perpetuate the obstacles. If, for instance, we want
more than just extensions of chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery for
cancer treatment in the long-term, we had better face up to the near292
term obstacles.
This is not to say that patent portfolio-enabled commercial R&D
should not be pursued for accumulated incremental gains, just that it
must be better complemented by prudently planned R&D into
associated basic science and technology. There is simply far too much
unknown about short-term and long-term efficacy and safety effects of
pertinent inventions considered individually and as a totality. More
importantly, there is even less known about whether the more ambitious
medical promises associated with NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi
will ever be efficacious and safe. Countless research articles have
identified obstacles for NB/BN and RNAi-enabled targeted drug
delivery and ways to surmount the obstacles, while also emphasizing
293
that there are probably additional, yet-to-be-identified obstacles.
A point rarely made in the literature comparing innovation in
semiconductors and the rapid growth of information technology with
the comparative slow growth of medical biotechnology is that the
intracellular and extracellular dynamics of human pathological
processes such as those associated with different types of cancer are
many times more complex than the complicated circuitry involved in
electrical engineering. Much research on the comparative lack of
progress in biotechnology has rightly focused on economic factors that
foster suboptimal incentives for innovation. However, it is very possible
that ignorance in basic science and technology—masked by hype—is an

SCI., 217, 219 (2007) (noting that, in 2003, over 60% of total R&D spending on biomedical
research was private).
292. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217.
293. See supra Part I.B.
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even greater barrier.
Despite high levels of scientific and technological knowledge and
skill in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, we need to push ourselves
to much higher levels to reap the major rewards in medical
breakthroughs that very carefully constructed interventions in these
295
technologies could provide twenty years hence. Evolution appears to
have created extraordinarily intricate, metabolically interdependent,
and seemingly ultimately phenotype-controlled, cellular, intercellular,
and molecular dynamics. This complexity, combined with the emergent
nature of the technologies, will demand much greater knowledge and
296
skill in all three technologies for us to realize the promises of hightech, highly personalized medicine.
CONCLUSION
NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi all hold great medical
promises but, despite hype suggesting the contrary, the greatest medical
promises will not be fulfilled in the near future. In the near-term, the
patent landscapes must be effectively uncluttered and patent
prosecutors must work with patent examiners to produce thorough and
precise patents that would increase confidence in patent quality. Patent

294. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 8.
In science-based business, R&D confronts fundamental questions about technical
feasibility. Is it possible to express a protein in a bacterial cell? Is it possible to
culture mammalian cells in vitro? What genes are involved in depression? Which
biochemical pathways are involved in inflammation? What role do kinases play in
certain diseases? Why are some people more likely than others to be stricken with
Alzheimer’s Disease? These are the types of questions with which science-based
businesses in biotechnology have had to grapple.
Not only are such questions difficult to answer, but the attempt to answer them leads, in
all likelihood, to more questions—or to unexpected results.
295. Regarding NB/BN, compare Chih-Ming Ho, Dean Ho, and Dan Garcia, BioNano-Information Fusion, 209, 220, in LYNN FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE,
INNOVATION, AND OPPORTUNITY (2006).
Although the nanotechnology industry is in a nascent stage, rapid advancements and
a streamlined road map of progress ensure that the future is quite promising. . . .
However, to reach this point in the roadmap, we must address in depth several key
areas. . . . Through the use of emerging technologies and methodologies for
discovery . . . we will achieve an unprecedented, more complex level of control of
biological molecules. This, in turn, will give us a deeper understanding of how . . .
biomolecules and their respective activities contribute to global functionality (such
as the systemic performance of the human body) to create an emergent behavior in
nature. In this way, nanotechnology will then be poised to reproduce this behavior
to combat disease. . . .
296. As well as in other related “anticipated” (that is, likely to emerge) technologies.
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portfolio construction and management must also be an integral part of
multidimensional modifiable roadmaps to commercialization. The
roadmaps should include initial patent portfolio-guided R&D path
construction and maintenance to generate and improve prospects for
exclusive licensing, financing, and acquisition.
Patent portfolio-enabled short-term commercialization nonetheless
needs to be complemented by scientific and technological commons.
Commons are needed to create valid and reliable building block
standards and to facilitate very high risk, but potentially revolutionary,
long-term biomedical R&D in these technologies. More prudent
government funding of long-term research would allow for both a
greatly increased understanding of the basic science and technology and
the capacity twenty years hence to translate that understanding into
revolutionary advances in clinical medicine.

